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CHAPTER I.
AN HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL SKETCH
Mozambique and Mozambicans are very poor. Output per person is of the 
order of $ 150 as the 1990s begin - half its level of the early 1970s.
About two-thirds of all Mozambicans exist in absolute poverty. The 
devastating fall in output per person of 1980-1986 has been halted and to a 
degree reversed. But the recovery is partial, limited by both security and 
revenue plus import capacity constraints, beleaguered by physical food 
shortages and dangerously dependent on external assistance.
From Independence To 1986
The pre-independence as well as the post independence history of Mozambique 
is relevant to seeing how the present situation came to be and how it can 
be altered. Portugal built up very little infrastructure for the 
territorial economy of Mozambique - either physically or embodied in 
skilled and professional personnel. (And 90% of the personnel were 
Portuguese of whom about 91% left within the 24 month period surrounding 
independence.) Colonial Mozambique's economy depended largely on selling 
workers, tourism and transport to South Africa, Rhodesia and Malawi. Its 
second main sector was agricultural and marine exports (cotton, tea, sugar, 
cashew, prawns). While investment rose sharply over 1955-70 and there was 
a good deal more urban and enterprise construction than before, Mozambique 
at independence was a fragile, externally focused economy with few internal 
linkages even by Sub-Saharan African standards.
Independence led to great shocks to the inherited economy. The Portuguese 
settlers left, Portugal nationalised the parent companies of many 
enterprises leaving the Mozambique government to keep their local branches 
running, South Africa cut both employment of workers and use of Maputo, 
sanctions against Rhodesia came into force and Rhodesia unleashed its newly 
created Bandidos Armados (MNR).
After transitional declines in the late stages of the liberation war, the 
interim government and early independence, the Mozambique government 
achieved economic stabilisation and - by 1980/81 - 5% annual growth. 
Achievements in health, education, water and sanitation were rapid. With
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Zimbabwe's independence ending the Rhodesian menace the 1980s looked set to 
be a period of full recovery.
For three reasons the reverse has been the case. The massive acquisition/ 
intervention of enterprises and farms by the state created a burden which 
was institutionally, financially and technically unsustainable - especially 
because retraining of Mozambican personnel promoted beyond both formal 
qualifications and experience lagged. The early 1980s Southern African 
drought cycle (with occasional typhoon floods) shook the always precarious 
rural food balance in several provinces. But above all South Africa's war 
of economic destabilisation, selective sabotage and mass terrorism had a 
shattering impact.
By the end of 1990 over 1,100,000 Mozambicans (660,000 infants and young 
children) were dead who would have lived if there had been no war. Over 
half the rural population had been forced out of their homes at least once. 
National output was very much under half what it would have been had the 
1980-81 rate of advance been continued - $ 22,800 million lost over the 
decade. Normal operation of public services, of markets, of production and 
of civil society (while slowly recovering over 1988-90) had been 
catastrophically disrupted for some period in over 80% of rural Mozambique.
Recovery, Prospects and Requirements
Recovery after 1986 has resulted in food and overall output growth 
approaching 5% and significant recovery in health services. But it is 
dependent on foreign finance, still limited in geographic coverage and does 
not involve more than a third of all Mozambicans.
The approach of peace and the first results of winning enhanced security 
open new opportunities. Rural life and services as well as agricultural 
production and transport can be restored. Over 6,000,000 refugees, 
dislocated and affected people can return to rebuild their homes and 
livelihoods as can perhaps 2 ,000,000 pauperised but still in their home 
districts.
However, to state the opportunity is to pose the challenge. Over half of 
the people of Mozambique need to rebuild their homes, livelihoods and 
lives. Over a third need to move - in many cases long distances to do so.
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Most face that task with little more than the clothes they wear and their 
bare hands.
Similarly, to restore and expand basic rural health, education, water and 
sector familial agricultural services and to rebuild infrastructure 
requires a nationwide network of public servants with skills, materials and 
finance.
CHAPTER II.
ABSOLUTE POVERTY REDUCTION: A STRUCTURAL PRIORITY
Absolute poverty and its persistence are not unique to Mozambique nor to 
Sub-Saharan Africa. They are major challenges to development far more 
generally.
Development is about people - as ends for which it is attempted and who 
benefit (or suffer) from its successes and failures and also as the primary 
means for its accomplishment. Certainly output of goods and services is 
important. In poor and lower middle income countries no realistic economic 
or political scenario does not require more resources per capita to meet 
needs (including that of political viability) and to provide incentives. 
Stability (or sustainability or balance) is also important because without 
it increased output of goods and services will not continue and because 
many kinds of instability - of law and order, of public policy, of food 
entitlements, of employment have very adverse affects on human beings. But 
there are crucial intermediate ends because of their impact on the ultimate 
end of human welfare (individual, household, community, social).
s But over 1945-1970 the poorest 25% to 50% of the households in all but a 
few poor and lower middle income countries made limited gains - if any - 
even though, on average, GDP per capita rose 1% to 2|% a year. Therefore, 
it came to be argued by conservative economists (e.g. Arthur Lewis) and 
major agency heads (e.g. President MacNamara) that development strategy 
needed to incorporate components specifically aimed at achieving the 
reduction of absolute poverty.
As very general principles, the foregoing paragraphs are rarely denied. 
However, attention to intermediate ends has a tendency to shove the 
underlying ends either to the periphery of actual operational strategy, 
policy and resource allocation or to be used to justify their deferral to
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the distant future. This is illustrated by the World Bank's recent Long 
Term Perspective Study. After demonstrating that over 1970-1990 many 
African economies and people have endured output, public service access 
and/or household consuming power declines of the order of 25%, it 
articulates a transformation to sustainable growth strategy with under 1% 
annual rise in per capita output and 0% in per capita private consumption 
for 1990-2010. The difficulties of demonstrating the feasibility of even 
this high a growth rate are very real and it does represent a turnaround. 
But is it humanly acceptable? In particular will it be acceptable for two 
decades to African people either as to social and political cohesion or as 
to providing adequate incentives?
Equally it would be disingenuous to suppose that any government ever valued 
the welfare of all residents/citizens equally. By and large it will (of 
necessity) place a particularly high weight on those of its present or 
potential supporters. It will also need to consider the needs/demands of 
groups able to block programmes or policies. For example, demobilisation 
support for ex-combatants is necessary insurance against pre- or post­
demobilisation violence as well as a way to protect a vulnerable group.
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This is not to deny that some governments do have a genuine concern for all 
their citizens and that for them "public interest" has a meaning. Nor is 
this public interest concern linked to any single political perspective.
The political projects of the governments of Botswana, Mozambique and 
Tanzania vary significantly but a high priority to the public interest and 
to poor household welfare is apparent in each governments policies and 
resource allocations. It is to say that unorganised poor people not 
perceived as supporters of a government nor relevant to its achieving its 
policy aims, including staying in office (whether by elections or 
otherwise), are unlikely to receive systematic priority attention in 
operational strategy, policy, programme and resource allocation decisions.
Structural adjustment - or at any rate sustainable structural adjustment 
with growth - is about development and at the very least is a medium term, 
systemic approach. It does seek to comprise major macro and sectoral 
strategic, policy, programmatic and resource allocation decisions. To 
suppose that development objectives not embedded in a structural adjustment 
strategy can be pursed effectively in parallel to a seriously pursued 
comprehensive structural adjustment strategy/programme is exceedingly 
naive. To attempt to do so by limiting the scope of the SAP is a recipe
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for confusion, incoherence, constant conflict and probable limited success 
(or failure) on all fronts. To attempt to add on social priorities runs a 
very high risk of peripheralisation.
Absolute Poverty And Development
Absolute poverty afflicts about one-third of the people of Sub-Saharan 
Africa according to the estimates contained in the 1990 World Development 
Report - Poverty. In proportion - not in absolute numbers - this is 
comparable to South and Southeast Asia as the highest incidence in the 
world. In SSA - unlike the Asian region - the proportion has been rising 
during the 1980s. Nationally the proportions vary for 60% or above in 
Mozambique, Ethiopia and Sudan to very low in Cape Verde, Mauritius and 
Botswana (after transfer payments).
On a household income basis, absolute poverty can be defined as an income 
level (cash and self-provisioning) over a minimum nutritionally adequate 
diet or as comparable to the poorest 40% of the population of India or by a 
more complex basic consumption needs yardstick. Neither the definition 
nor, especially, the 'count' (more accurately rough and ready estimates) 
are particularly precise. Nor is the borderline between absolutely poor 
and plain (or less) poor precise. But the category does mean something and 
is identifiable - not least by those locked into it.
While global data tend to concentrate on the household income aspect of 
absolute poverty, access to basic services including health-education- 
water, extension, infrastructure (e.g. transport and communications), 
markets and family planning are no less relevant. In the first place they 
do affect household welfare - as perceived by poor people. In the second, 
their absence is often a major contributory factor to present low household 
incomes and an even greater obstacle to poor households raising their real 
incomes in the foreseeable future.
If development is about people and on average a third of the people are 
absolutely poor - and that percentage is stagnant or rising - development 
needs to address the issues relating to how these households could share in 
gains in output. And if development is being conducted within a structural 
adjustment with growth and transformation frame, then the SAP also needs to 
address reduction of absolute poverty seriously if any serious results are 
to be attained. That is not to say either that SAPs cause absolute poverty
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nor that SAP negative impacts on absolutely poor people should be offset by 
special measures limited to this sub-category. It is to assert rather more 
- that absolute poverty represents an unsustainable structural imbalance 
(on the productivity-production-consumption and on the access to basic 
services fronts) which it should be a priority of any comprehensive SAP to 
reduce just as much as fiscal, food or external account structural 
imbalances.
Who Are Absolutely Poor?
Absolutely poor households are not homogeneous as to location, sources of 
income, degree of poverty. That is true in any country and among 
countries.
For SSA as a whole about 90% of absolutely poor households are rural.
About 75-80% of SSA households are rural and the proportion of rural 
absolute poverty is higher than of urban. Rural socio-economic groups 
(overlapping) with high proportions of absolute poverty include households 
which are:
a. landless or near landless without substantial, regular remittances from 
urban working household members;
b. female headed;
c. aged or crippled headed;
d. without significant sources of cash income other than food crops;
e. isolated (physically or socio politically);
f. in hostile ecological zones;
g. victims of natural disaster;
h. victims of war.
Urban absolutely poor households are perhaps 10% of the total in SSA as a 
whole. However, this varies widely. In Zambia, which is 60% urban and 
peri-urban, they may well be of the order of 40% because peri-urban and 
compound absolute poverty rates - except for access to health and education 
services - appear comparable to many rural districts. In any case 10% of
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the total implies of the order of 10-15% of urban households which is not 
negligible. The perception that urban absolute poverty is negligible has 
been untrue in some areas - e.g. the exurbs of Dakar, Mathare Valley and 
its successors in Nairobi, Kinshasa's bidonvilles - for at least 20 years. 
But it is also true that the 1980s have caused it to increase as a 
proportion of total absolute poverty: urban economies have often fared 
worse than rural in output terns, victims of rural disaster have often fled 
to urban areas, traditional security systems have eroded faster in urban 
areas under the excessive strains imposed by 10 (or in some cases nearly 
30) years of economic unsuccess.
Urban household absolute poverty tends to be concentrated in the following 
groups:
a. drawing on only one income source (excluding salaries and business 
proprietorships);
b. lacking any formal sector wage earner;
c. female headed;
d. aged or crippled headed;
e. victims of natural disasters, sacking (including 'redeployment') and 
war.
f. gaining primary income from informal sector employment or urban petty 
commodity production.
What Is To Be Done? A Strategic Overview
The details of activities which reduce absolute poverty are frequently very 
context specific. To attempt to articulate them in simple, homogeneous 
terms even for a whole province or region, let alone a country and least of 
all SSA (or the world) is likely to be highly counterproductive. The only 
simple, concrete, universally applicable answers at that level are wrong 
ones. At the level of strategic formulation matters are somewhat different 
- a general model can usefully be attempted.
In SSA its main elements are:
a. enable absolutely poor households to produce more;
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b. provide increasing access (toward universality over a finite period) to 
basic services including "human investment" (health-education-water), 
extension (not only in agriculture), infrastructure (especially 
transport and communications) and commercial;
c. restoration of peace and of law and order (which however inadequate as 
sufficient conditions for development have tended to be grossly 
underemphasised as virtually necessary ones);
d. provision of safety nets (survival support) for these households and 
isolated individuals who temporarily or permanently cannot produce 
enough to survive or escape from absolute poverty.
This formulation - except for its third element as a separate strategic 
component - is not particularly novel. WDR-1990: Poverty's is relatively
similar. However, it is uncomfortably true that the emphasis - verbally 
and in resource transfers - on "b" and - more recently even verbally and 
except for disaster, including war, victims still with little resource 
backing - on "c" has rather obscured that a - more production by absolutely 
poor people - is central. It suffers not so much from conscious rejection 
but from the apparent near invisibility of absolutely poor people to 
programme and project designers - with the very partial exception of rural 
public works. Similarly "b" has here been reformulated to link basic human 
services with production enhancing services (albeit extension could also be 
linked with primary and adult under basic education), with physical 
infrastructure and with access to reasonably functioning markets 
(commercial infrastructure).
Absolutely poor households do not exist in vacuums. Many programmes (most 
excluding safety nets) benefiting them will benefit other households. But 
five points are relevant:
a. in the case of basic services a drive toward universal access is almost 
the only way to reach absolutely poor households (and women more 
generally);
b. some programmes - e.g. basic agricultural input supply, extension and 
training services for urban artisans - do benefit absolutely poor 
households more;
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c. in others - e.g. credit, extension - it is necessary to articulate how 
the absolutely poor will have access at the design stage or they will 
in fact be excluded during implementation;
d. increases in less poor and not so poor incomes are not inimical to the 
welfare of the absolutely poor if within a context informed by the 
first three points;
e. one need not quite go as far as Joan Robinson's comment that the only 
thing worse than being exploited is not to be worth anyone1s time and 
effort to exploit to recognise that effective market access is needed 
to reduce absolute poverty (as is more formal and informal wage 
employment) and that most commercial business persons (employers) are 
not poor unless they are failing and unable to deliver the goods 
(literally as well as figuratively). Safeguards against exploitation 
are often needed but so are successful non-poor merchants and employers 
are at least as essential.
Poverty and Structural Adjustment: What Linkages?
If structural adjustment is about development, development about human 
beings and absolute poverty a major obstacle to development, then the 
appropriate linkage of structural development strategy and policy with 
absolute poverty is clear. The reduction of absolute poverty enabling 
absolutely poor people and households to produce more and to have less 
constricted access to services and to society is a key goal. The 
structures creating and enforcing absolute poverty require adjustment now 
and transformation out of existence over a finite time period. In that 
case the appropriate debate is about ways, means and side effects.
Poverty in Africa - as elsewhere - is not new. It has changed in immediate 
causation, in who is poor, in some cases in location but not in the fact of 
its widespread existence. Some - not all - present forms of poverty flow 
form the structures of the colonial era, as do some present forms of being 
not so poor. But poverty from drought, war and limited technological 
capacity for dealing with food storage, unfavourable climates and soils and 
health has been recorded as far back as records exist (e.g. for over a 
thousand years in part of the Sahel, Sudan and Ethiopia).
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The present forms and levels of absolute poverty include three elements 
which have little or nothing to do - in origin - with structural 
adjustment. The first is continuing absolute poverty enhanced (or pushed 
down and expanded) in some cases by expanding populations overloading and 
degrading (by necessity not greed or folly) passable land and pushing out 
into areas of poor soils (and pastures) and/or risky rainfall. The second 
is those once vulnerable, now absolutely poor, who have been hit by 
economic stagnation, decline and/or disintegration. Falls of a quarter or 
more in per capita output necessarily push down the livelihoods of most 
households. The vulnerable - low wage, low skill employment whether formal 
or informal; living in areas of poor soil or climatic risk; dependent on 
crops whose prices fell or transport routes and commercial networks which 
fell into decay - households have more or less by definition, fared badly. 
So have many new young households setting up in a hostile economic climate 
and those whose particular losses (drought, fire, illness, crippling, death 
of an adult household member) might have been transitory in "good times but 
have been rendered permanent by the declined caused weakening of family 
community and state safety nets (survival) and helping hands 
(rehabilitation of livelihoods). The third are the victims of war - 
refugees, internally displaced, severely affected - or of parallel war and 
drought.
In most SSA states the largest category of absolutely poor households is 
the first. Overall they may well number up to 75 million persons in 12.5 
million households - including new absolutely poor households born into 
that structural context. The second category may be of the order of 40 
million persons as may the third but which is largest depends very much on 
the country. The third group are concentrated in Angola, Mozambique,
Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Malawi (including refugees and their fellow poor 
Malawians who, unlike the Malawi government, bear a heavy burden in helping 
them survive), Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, Chad and Liberia.
People in these three groups are of the order of 95% to 97|% of absolutely 
poor people in SSA. And it is enabling them to escape from absolute 
poverty which is a central challenge to and priority for rehabilitation and 
development strategy and praxis.
To argue about whether Structural Adjustment does have negative effects for 
some poor people is as beside the point as to argue whether overall growth
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is necessary for sustainable efforts to reduce absolute poverty. The 
answer to both questions is yes, but the basic issues are more complex:
a. most absolute poverty is not a social consequence of structural 
adjustment;
b. therefore mitigating the social consequences of adjustment cannot - 
taken literally - touch the core of the problem;
c. there is a systematic tendency to concentrate on health, education, 
water and - in some cases - labour intensive infrastructural work (seen 
as a consumption subsidy with employment and output mitigating factors 
more than as an efficient way of creating an enabling environment for 
production) and, with that partial exception, to pay little attention 
to enabling poor households to produce more;
d. and in parallel to concentrate resources on livelihood restoration on 
terminated ("redeployed") civil servants who are often not absolutely 
poor and are in no case more than 2% of absolutely poor households.
The poor design (as to entrants' interests and abilities, the market 
for the livelihoods promoted and, in some cases, the technical 
programme content) of most of the schemes is a secondary but additional 
defect;
e. with little effort and less success in making these programmes central 
to SAP strategic design and implementation - even when some other 
elements of health and education have been integrated.
Three Basic Elements
If the main thrust of absolute poverty reduction is to be on self- 
sustaining lines, it must increase poor households production, incomes and 
consumption. If it does that, parallel public expenditure increases on 
basic human and extension services and infrastructure can be largely offset 
by increased taxes collected - assuming a plausible indirect tax system.
No other approach is feasible, on a scale which would enable large erosion 
of the numbers of absolutely poor household units, in more than a handful 
of Sub-Saharan African economies. The question is - how?
Articulated answers can be thought out and acted upon group by group. One 
example relates to female headed households and to women more generally.
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Women1s income is constrained by total workload and by limited access to 
employment, land and credit. These constraints are particularly binding on 
rural, female headed households but are by no means absent in urban low 
income areas with poor and time consuming (or expensive) access to water, 
health services, fuel and transport.
The workload problem is very easy to describe: collecting wood and water, 
tending the sick (especially but not only children) and taking them to 
medical facilities, household and clothing cleansing and maintenance and 
cooking are seen as "women's work". In the absence of nearby drinking 
water, easy access to health posts and reliable, cheap public transport 
they can take up to 10 hours a day. That leaves inadequate time to produce 
much to eat or to sell and virtually precludes a full time formal sector 
job unless children are left on their own or child minders found (e.g. 
grandmothers or 'grandmothers').
One immediate consequence is that the first step to raising women's incomes 
often needs to be reducing workload. For this purpose raising productivity
e.g. in agriculture - and reducing time spent on wooding and watering (e.g. 
village or household woodlot development, broadening access to stand-pipe 
water) can be equally effective. One raises output per hour in the field 
and the others raise hours available to spend in the field.
Traditional land tenure normally gave wives and widows secure access to 
land to raise food for household provisioning but does so within household 
allocation because virtually all women were in one or another way members 
of male headed households. Modernisation has often eroded security within 
the household without evolving tenure to give adult females (especially 
heads of household) direct access to land use rights. The policy needed is 
not so much "modernisation" of tenure but evolution - direct female access 
to land use rights on the same basis as male. This is especially true for 
women who need to produce not only to provision their households but also 
to earn an income by producing with the intention of selling (i.e. cash 
cropping).
Access to employment for women is constrained by their non-income 
generating workload, socially or historically determined gender divisions 
of labour and near literal 'invisibility' to potential employers as well as 
by educational and experience gaps related to (flowing in large part from) 
the 'accepted' division of labour. How strong customary social objections
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to women's waged employment are, and how difficult it is to overcome 
invisibility varies. Purdah is an extreme case (albeit it does not prevent 
home based production and trade in goods and services) but is not the norm 
even in a majority of SSA Islamic communities. Elsewhere domestic and 
seasonal agricultural labour for cash are normal. As the case of 
Botswana's rural supplementary employment programme demonstrated the 
supposed failure of women to seek public works jobs often related largely 
to well-founded belief they wouldn't be hired or invisibility to hirers and 
vanishes when the women and the hirers know that hiring a substantial 
proportion of women is required (advised may not pierce the veil of 
invisibility). The appearance of women to employ and the absence of 
significant negative reaction to their being hired suggests that "social 
norms"/"community values" as a general barrier to employing women are more 
often asserted than real.
Lack of skills is partly real - artisanal and related secondary and adult 
education courses have few women enroled except in traditional "women's 
work" largely because that is their open or subliminal enrollment policy. 
But much is "social custom" (by women including educated women responsible 
for promoting women's employment!). Unskilled and semi-skilled 
construction work does not require formal training - learning is on the 
job, informal and brief. In Asia women are employed in this work (as they 
now are in Botswana). Yet the "not suitable"/"not trained" excuse is still 
raised and still accepted by women.
Livelihood Rehabilitation
A special set of enabling measures are needed in livelihood rehabilitation 
s cases. These relate to households (urban and rural) whose livelihoods have 
been wiped out by economic collapse, natural disasters or war. They may 
well number 30 to 50 million (e.g. 6 million refugees, displaced persons 
and severely war affected persons in Mozambique, over 2 million in the 
exurbs of Khartoum - Omdurman - Khartoum North). Because they have lost 
their assets (e.g. access to cleared land, houses and household equipment, 
tools, working capital inputs whether seed for farmers or wood for 
carpenters, livestock) they cannot make a new start without funding beyond 
that needed by an absolutely poor household which already has a real - even 
if inadequate production base. Transport home, tools to clear and build as
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well as till, core livestock, artisans tools and initial materials, food 
until harvests - or artisanal sales - are among the requirements.
Unfortunately livelihood rehabilitation falls in a deep ditch between two 
established fields: survival relief and development promotion. Aid 
agencies and - to a slightly lesser extent - domestic disaster-calamities- 
emergency operations concentrate on the former while the latter is outside 
development strategy as defined in SAPs or national macroeconomic 
strategies. UNHCR and WFP have some experience in this field but in SSA 
perhaps 80% of the persons are not formally refugees and neither UNHCR nor 
WFP have the resources (logistical and personnel as well as financial) to 
do more than play supporting roles in nationally devised, international 
consortium funded strategies when - if - they emerge.
Absolutely poor households have in practice absolutely poor access to 
health and education as well as to nearby pure water. They are - even in 
urban poor areas - afflicted by inadequate to near non-existent access to 
infrastructure (especially transport and communications) and to extension 
services. These lacks of access combine with low selling and purchasing 
power - plus war and local level oligopoly/oligosony - to deny them 
effective and adequate market access; a weakness sometimes exacerbated by 
regulations designed to protect public sector (or on occasion - e.g. 
Tanzania co-ops over 1986-90 - private sector) commercial bodies intended 
to improve equitable market access but failing to do so.
These gaps are neither of purely welfare nor only of longer term economic 
significance. People who are malnourished, uneducated and in poor health 
cannot work very long, very hard or very productively. Producers who find 
they cannot sell or - if they can - cannot buy desired goods will not 
produce. Women tied down by watering and caring for the sick have neither 
time nor energy to produce for self-provisioning or for sale. These points 
may appear self-evident. Unfortunately they do not, in practice, form part 
of the built-in background to most rehabilitation, structural adjustment 
and development discourse.
Infrastructure rehabilitation is another area of agreement in principle but 
problems of organising ways and finance. The approach of labour intensive 
construction and maintenance has been discussed above. So long as large 
national food deficits, concentrated in urban areas, remain the use of the
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counterpart funds of additional monetised food aid may be one practical 
avenue for augmenting finance.
Commercial infrastructures (vehicles to transport, cash to purchase, goods 
to sell, shops and warehouses and - above all - businessmen) are vital to 
absolutely poor households. In much of rural SSA that lifeblood of the 
commercialised economy has been thinned or virtually drained away. 
Exploitation is a problem but low volume of trade and low numbers of 
traders worsen it. Therefore, encouraging (allowing) more commercial units 
and more competition (possibly with fair price shops and buyers of last 
resort as back-ups) is the first step toward limiting exploitation.
Safety nets are needed for those absolutely poor households who either 
temporarily (e.g. orphans, calamity victims) or permanently (e.g. aged, 
disabled), are, and will be, unable to raise their production to levels 
compatible with passing the household consumption absolute poverty line.
The case for safety nets is normatively absolute and has an economic front 
in respect to those who can in the future be productive. The main debate 
is about affordability and practicability.
For calamity victims the three crises points are: averting the need to 
leave homes (by prompt food or employment provision); organising facilities 
and flows of goods to camps for those who do need to leave home; livelihood 
restoration after the calamity. The weakness of the last has been cited 
earlier. The weakness of the first two appears to lie in the efficacy or 
otherwise of early warning systems broadly defined, e.g. in 1990 Tanzania 
flood relief was prompt, effective and scheduled to cover the period to the 
next harvest; Zambian and Zimbabwean information flows were disastrously 
slow so that, even if grain, vehicles, finance and a high level will to act 
were present (as all were in Zimbabwe), action did not happen until 
triggered by reports of actual calamity and was then hampered by logistical 
bottlenecks which an earlier, phased response could have averted.
The Struggle To Reduce Absolute Poverty
To reduce absolute poverty rapidly requires acting on a broad front, within 
other main line strategic objectives (not primarily in separate 
programmes), contextually and at a low cost per household served or 
enabled. The first three conditions relate to the logic of reducing
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absolute poverty and of coherent economic strategy and resource allocation 
- the last to resource constraints.
The LTPS sets out a broad - albeit incomplete set of public expenditure 
programmes and targets. These adjusted for rather austere levels of 
administration, emergency/survival and security expenditure come to about a 
third of GDP or $190 per capita on average for SSA. As most of the 
programmes are ones required to enable growth, and have minimum levels per 
household or area to be effective at all, they are - unfortunately from the 
resource mobilisation point of view - not readily reduced in cases of below 
average GDP. For countries with $150-200 per capita GDP estimates (which 
probably reflect inaccurate pricing of domestic GDP after massive 
inflation, parallel marketing and devaluation with more realistic estimates 
in the $200-250 range) the figures would imply, say, a 25% recurrent 
domestic revenue to GDP ratio plus up to $100 per capita net soft inward 
external resource transfers. No large SSA state has ever achieved the 
latter - and only a few the former. This very real problem is exacerbated 
because the $140 does not include debt service and while a roll-over of 
principal is a plausible assumption interest will not be insignificant.
f
Of the $140 about half will necessarily go on very general heads (law and 
order, i.e. security and administration, housekeeping, large 
infrastructural projects) which can create a macroeconomic context for 
reducing absolute poverty but cannot by themselves do so. If, of the 
remaining $70 per capita one assumes - optimistically - the same proportion 
is absolute poverty reduction oriented as absolutely poor households form 
of all households and then $20 per capita on basic services, $5 per capita 
on research and extension, $15 per capita on public works and other 
infrastructure (including commercial sector), $5 per capita on emergency 
survival and income supplements and $25 per capita on enabling additional 
production per absolutely poor person are more or less maxima. In fact 
$140 is not attainable in many countries in the short run - under half that 
in some cases so that $25-50 per capita ($150-300) per household addressed 
to poverty reduction is the maximum realistic range in most poor countries 
if high priority is given domestically and if external sources of finance 
are responsive. The case for broad access is, therefore, necessarily a 
case for low cost per household served/enable programmes, not high per 
household cost projects (including traditional agricultural development 
projects, especially most large scale irrigation ventures). The latter may
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or may not enable some households to escape from absolute poverty (given 
actual clientele selection success rates rather few in practice), but 
cannot be generalised to broad access because of resource constraints.
But broad front, low unit cost programmes articulate into contextually 
differentiated sub-programmes and micro projects are not readily compatible 
with existing planning and design practices especially if they are to be 
within a coordinated national strategic framework. The instant answer of 
decentralisation to regional/provincial and district levels is partial. It 
may deal with contextuality (albeit as a necessary not a sufficient 
condition). It cannot by itself result in a national strategic framework 
or inter-regional allocations. Nor given the extreme shortages of high and 
middle level personnel (nationally and therefore - necessarily - a fortiori 
at district level) can it provide effective overall design and technical 
back-up services.
Further, absolute poverty reduction programming is even more dependent on 
detailed substantive content of activities than most economic 'sectoral' 
work. A macroeconomic body which seeks to do more than set a frame for and 
coordinate specialised operational body (ministries, regional and district 
analogues, local government and domestic civil society organisations) will 
be unlikely to be effective even if it is fully decentralised. The actual 
present framework is one of anarchy not over-centralisation, especially 
where external governmental and NGO operation of autonomous projects and 
pseudo governmental units has emerged as a major decapacitating force 
against local, regional and national government. For example, one district 
in northern Mozambique had over 60 rural projects responsible to half as 
many agencies (over half foreign) with non-coordinated and often partly 
* inconsistent objectives none of which corresponded very closely to what 
poor peasant households stated to be their priorities.
Accountability and coordination both require quantifying and dating inputs 
and intermediate outputs plus at least order of magnitude targeting of 
final outputs plus accounting/auditing mechanisms to keep track of the 
flows and cumulative results. Even on universal access programmes such 
exercises are possible and relatively easy conceptually and given present 
data processing methods actually if initial entries are appropriately 
cross-coded. Quantifying and dating - apart from more evident operational 
pay-offs - should help prioritise and sequence. At present there are
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tendencies to look at programmes in isolation and either to seek universal 
coverage within five years or to start at such small levels that by year 6 
coverage would still be below 10% (which may make sense as pilot testing 
but not once main line programmes are begun). The former approach is 
unrealistic given instrumental, institutional, personnel and finance/forex 
constraints; the latter either represents low prioritisation, 
technological/technical caution run rampant or a failure to recognise 
political reality.
Absolute poverty reduction targets are no less logical than GDP growth or 
budgetary balance ones (and no less problematic and subject to misuse). 
What is practicable will vary widely. In the 40% to 60% absolutely poor 
households cases a 6% a year trend reduction until 25% is reached and 5% a 
year thereafter might be a starting guide-line and for others 5% a year. 
However, given lags this might be a target to be reached in year 3 after 
serious implementation begins.
CHAPTER III.
POVERTY IN MOZAMBIQUE - A THEMATIC OVERVIEW
Poverty is central to the society and economy of Mozambique. Most 
Mozambicans are poor and Mozambique is one of the world's poorest 
countries.
Poverty is a central social, political and economic challenge to 
Mozambique. Because its base is low productivity per household and per 
employee, poverty is the mirror image of low national output. Because it 
denies most households access to humanly acceptable levels of consumption, 
access to basic services and ability to participate in civil society 
poverty weakens and distorts society. Politically, continued mass poverty 
is a denial of the basic goals of the government of the Republic of 
Mozambique.
Adam Smith's warning that no nation can be great and prosperous the 
majority of whose people are poor and miserable applies very forcefully in 
Mozambique. At the same time it points to a way forward. The majority of 
poor Mozambican households are not producing much because they lack access 
to tools, to wage employment, to land, to basic health-education-water-
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extension services, to infrastructure and to markets. Enabling them to
produce more - and acting to provide services and infrastructure as well as 
security as part of that enabling strategy - is central to any government 
development strategy that is to be economically or politically sustainable 
beyond a relatively brief time frame.
Absolute Poverty In Mozambique
To say that almost all Mozambicans are poor is true but also trite. In a 
country with a per capita output of US$ 150 or less and the highest common 
citizen annual salary (earned by 150 odd persons) US$ 2,150 (and only 
24,250 estimated to earn over US$ 1,000 a year or more from salaried 
employment) the ubiquity of poverty is inevitable. But to identify 95% to 
97% of Mozambicans as poor is to make it impossible to focus on priority 
steps to safeguard the human condition and augment the earning/producing 
power of the very or absolutely poor.
It is necessary to attempt to separate poverty from absolute poverty (or 
extreme poverty) and to identify structural and conjunctural causes of 
poverty to achieve an intelligible, articulated picture and a basis for 
identifying possible policy approaches to absolute poverty reduction. To 
do so in Mozambique is difficult for three reasons:
1 . the war has made rural data collection incomplete and rural social 
conditions unstable as well as worse;
2 . urban and institutional data surveys, collection and - especially 
analysis - have been fragmentary, discontinuous and sometimes 
inconsistent;
3. studies have been carried out on various aspects of the social 
condition and of poverty in isolation from each other not merely 
without prior co-ordination but largely without subsequent joint 
consideration or consolidation.
The main absolutely poor groups are:
a. urban households with cash incomes per family member of below MT 6,000 
per month (US$ 6 odd) combined with lack of access to a productive 
machamba (small farm plot);
19
b. peri-urban residents with limited access (usually for security reasons) 
to farming land, substantial food purchase requirements and very 
limited potential for cash income earning;
c. displaced and severely affected persons and refugees who are victims of 
the war and the consequential destruction of normal rural life in many 
districts;
d. other rural households with limited access to seeds, tools, markets or 
goods to buy.
While absolute poverty map sketching as carried out above does identify 
categories of households likely to be in absolute poverty and also - to a 
degree - "target groups" for certain policies and programmes it does not 
lead to differentiated causal explanations or sub-group identification.
Two broad categories of poverty (and of absolute poverty) exist - 
structural and conjunctural. Structural causes are relatively permanent 
and conjunctural (unless the negative exogenous event puts them in a 
structural poverty category, e.g. blind, crippled) are more likely to be
f
transitory and readily reversible.
Structural poverty in Mozambique includes many persons who are:
a. crippled and blind;
b . orphans;
c. aged without support of relatives;
d. in households with low labour power relative to household size (e.g. 
female headed, larger than normal numbers of children);
e. with poor access to employment (location, absence of skills) or land 
(location).
Conjunctural poverty includes:
a. deslocados, afectados and refugees (victims of war);
b. many urban employed (at least as of mid-1988 victims of relative price 
and charges/wages changes);
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C. drought distressed households;
d. unemployed who lost their job as a result of world economic context or 
domestic economic policy changes.
Vulnerable Groups
Vulnerability means being at severe risk of further falls. For present 
purposes the relevant vulnerability is descent to the margin of, or into, 
absolute poverty. Virtually all absolutely poor people must be considered 
vulnerable. Their vulnerability is to abject pauperisation and higher 
mortality rates (i.e. death). Their margins of living above survival are 
at best slim - indeed many are not well nourished or healthy enough to work 
long, hard or productively. Any negative external event endangers their 
ever being able to escape from absolute poverty and increases their 
morbidity and mortality rates.
However, vulnerable households also include those whose initial position 
was above the absolute poverty line. Many former Mozambican mine workers 
in South Africa are absolutely poor; those still with jobs (expected t fall 
by at least 50% over 1988-93) are vulnerable. In 1987, 20,000 odd central 
and provincial government employees were vulnerable. In 1988 they largely 
became absolutely poor when government employment contracted by 21,114 
(dominantly at provincial - 16,577 - and district - 3,433 - levels) since 
most appear to have been low skill workers with little chance of securing 
jobs in an at best slowly growing enterprise employment total, of carrying 
out productive or adequately remunerated self-employment or of returning to 
the land in the prevailing security situation.
Vulnerability at household level can be summarised under seven causal 
characteristics:
1 . a high dependency ratio (few working hands to feed many hungry mouths);
2 . female headed (with lesser employment opportunities and a conflict 
between income earning and other necessary activities);
3. lack of any household member in wage employment;
4. lack of access to adequate, secure, suitable land (whether for sector 
familial farming or income augmenting zonas verdes production);
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5. recent - usually forced - migration to urban areas, limited opportunity
rural areas or deslocado camps;
6 . location in an area currently or recently severely affected by natural
calamities and/or insecurity emergencies (usually associated with 
destruction of services and infrastructure and weakening or collapse of 
market access);
7. lack of links to social networks with ability to support (most severe
for isolated orphans, aged and crippled persons).
PRE and Poverty Reduction, Social Conditions Gains
One element in PRE policy and practice should be to counteract the absolute 
poverty increasing impact risk of certain of its instruments. In respect 
to household incomes in urban/suburban areas the main identifiable 
instrument is the minimum wage supported by action to increase employment, 
selective, targeted support measures where these are identifiable and 
feasible (e.g. drug charge capping). In respect to basic services the 
thrust needs to be threefold: a) restoring real government allocations
t
over time; b) mobilising and deploying additional funds from external 
sources and c) increasing efficiency of resource management and utilisation 
(e.g. reduction of probable drug wastage and inappropriate use through 
inventory and flow control plus use monitoring).
However, the proper concerns of PRE in respect to absolute poverty 
reduction and social welfare enhancement must go far beyond damage 
limitation. Enhancing the human condition in particular by increased 
access to basic services (especially health, education, water) of 
acceptable quality, ability to produce or to afford to buy adequate food 
and employment or self employment adequately productive and fairly 
remunerative to cover basic household costs have been and remain central to 
Mozambique's development goals.
One central thrust towards achieving them has to be increasing the quantity 
and quality (productivity and resultant wage or income) of employment 
(especially in urban and peri-urban areas) and self-employment (notably but 
not only in the agricultural familial sector). Specific policies and 
programmes as well as economic expansion more generally are needed to 
achieve this. In particular rehabilitation of infrastructure, housing and
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directly productive assets can use significant numbers of workers at least 
temporarily or seasonally, provide demand to reactivate certain sectors of 
industry and be financed via external recovery/rehabilitation assistance 
including food aid. The rural familial sector requirements are more 
complex including in many cases enhanced security but also including access 
to inputs, to transport, to markets and to goods to buy over time 
increasingly complemented by research and extension and general (health, 
education, pure water) services.
Augmenting the public revenue base as the economy recovers and restoring 
the share devoted to recurrent health, education, pure water and extension 
(agricultural and other) services as subsidy requirements are pruned (and 
the still unsustainable debt service burden negotiated downward) is of 
comparable importance both for absolute poverty reduction in the present 
and future generations and for increasing labour productivity and the human 
capital base. Given the limits to possible gains in the short term - and 
the continuing security expenditure burden - additional resource 
mobilisation measures will need to be identified and applied within the PRE 
context.
The extent and nature of potential domestic mobilisation is unclear. As 
World Bank consultants in both the Health and Education sectors have noted, 
most Mozambicans are poor enough that standard user charges cannot form a 
major source of finance for them. In the case of stand-pipe water the case 
may be somewhat different, at least in areas now dependent on purchases 
from water carriers. Under certain conditions in other SSA economies 
substantial supply of furniture, materials plus maintenance and 
construction labour for basic facilities have been by the user communities.
* However, realistically targeted mobilisation of foreign resources for
specified purposes - recurrent as well as capital - is needed. In respect 
to recurrent expenditure, foreign exchange intensive items e.g. paper and 
ink for textbooks, drugs and medical supplies, spare parts for equipment 
and vehicles maintenance are priorities because maintenance and supplies - 
despite some restoration in the 1989 and 1990 budgets - have apparently 
been severely squeezed since 1981 and especially over 1985-88. The 
appearance is worse than reality because of off-budget commodity aid but 
only in the case of drugs is a confident assertion that physical quantities 
have risen possible.
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Third given the limits on practicable resource mobilisation, efficiency in 
use must be increased by more tightly focused priority objectives, if 
necessary with elimination of certain desirable but unsustainable services 
(e.g. perhaps urban funerals by health). Similarly, changes are needed in 
allocation, control and use of resources to limit wastage and strayage and 
to reduce wastes resulting from imbalances of resources (e.g. vehicles and 
staff without petrol) and inadequate maintenance.
On balance the evidence points strongly to three interim conclusions:
1. By helping to halt generalised economic decline and contraction of
basic services PRE has virtually halted or slightly reversed the upward
trend of 1981-86 in numbers of absolutely poor people;
2. A large proportion of this gain turns on increased Food Aid;
3. PRE may have created a base from which to mount future strategic 
struggles to reduce absolute poverty levels significantly. To date it 
has not actually had such strategies adequately conceptualised, 
articulated, funded or staffed to launch such a struggle on a broad
f
front, much less to reduce numbers of households afflicted by absolute 
poverty.
CHAPTER IV.
URBAN ABSOLUTE POVERTY
At present attempts to identify a poverty line and poverty mapping must 
build on the Tete and Maputo 1988 Household Surveys which are primarily 
nutrition studies and whose key tests of poverty are high percentages of 
low birth weights and child growth faltering.
The 1988 Tete study had rather better budget study data and found MT 4,000 
(in 1988 prices perhaps MT 6,000 to 6,500 in end 1990 prices) per household 
member per month expenditure to be the level above which child growth 
faltering declines rapidly. This level has been used for Maputo on the 
basis that while Tete food costs are moderately higher energy costs are 
moderately and urban transport costs (because of much shorter distances
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almost all walkable) radically lower and those of basic consumer goods not 
markedly different.
From data culled from several sources, a MT 32,000 (1988 prices) household 
budget (an eight person unit which is the urban average) for Maputo can be 
sketched on a stylized basis:
Abastecimento MT 16,000
Other Food MT 2 , 0 0 0 - 6, 0 0 0
Fue1-wood/Charcoa1 MT 4,000 - 6, 0 0 0
Transport to work MT 4,000
Fees (especially school) MT 2 , 0 0 0 - 4,000
All other consumption MT 1 , 0 0 0 - 4,000
(Clothes, Household Goods, Rent)
This is for a canisa household living in a self-constructed house. The 
lower other food figure would be with possession of a productive machamba 
(for self-provisioning or sale - held by perhaps 10% and 5% of such 
households respectively)^ A concrete city household would have a different 
pattern. Rent would probably be MT 5,000 - 7,500 offset by elimination of 
urban transport and by income from sub-letting (or for sub-tenants perhaps 
MT 2,000 - 3,000 offset by the transport exclusion). Energy costs could be 
half as high or one-and-a-half times depending on economies from using 
electricity or kerosene and/or pooling cooking of two or more households 
and extra costs from using charcoal. Access to productive machambas would 
be less or would incur either cash, transport or long walking time costs 
while access to other secondary (including informal sector) incomes would 
* probably be somewhat better than for a canisa household.
Estimating incomes is more problematic. Nationally it is estimated that 
there are as of mid-1988, 580,000 formal sector jobs about 400,000 of which 
are urban. On the basis of Maputo's virtually 50% share in urban 
population this would suggest 200,000 odd in Maputo. The Urban Survey 
however, suggests about 140,000 - 150,000, a serious discrepancy for 
purposes of estimating absolute poverty. A different employment estimate 
for January 1988, shows 500,000 categorized (by type and income 
distribution) of which perhaps 350,000 are urban. This suggests 160,000 
for Maputo which is much closer to the survey result. Employees showed
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about two-third at or above MT 22,500 a month. The Urban Survey indicates 
about a quarter of households had no modern sector wage earner, a half one, 
and a quarter two. Fairly clearly households with no salario are - except 
for self-employed businessmen of some substance - almost certain to be in 
absolute poverty while those with two are certain not to be. The 50% group 
is the problematic one. Several schematic income structures to reach MT 
32,000 can be constructed:
1 Salario 1 Salario 2 Salario 
No Salario Minimo 22,500+ Minimo
Salario 0 17,000* 22,500 32.000:
Secondary/
Informal income 32,000 15,000 9,500 -
Total 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000
( 1 Operario - 2 Empregados)
Except for business households the first column requires secondary and 
informal income levels (of head of household and other members) which are 
highly unlikely to be attainable. The third column and the fourth are 
clearly likely to be attainable. The question is on the second. To reach 
MT 15,000 would require say MT 5,000 casual and after hours income by the
salario earner, MT 6,000 to 8,000 by one or more other informal sector
adults and MT 2,000 to 4,000 by children or largely unemployed or semi­
crippled or aged adults (or receiving a pension or sub-letting parto fo a 
house or flat income). The best that can be said is that this is probably 
possible but not universally attained.
That suggests Maputo (and, by analogy in the absence of any hard data, 
other cities) absolute poverty in early 1989 was about 30%:
No salario Households 90% (22,5)
One salario Households 16% ( 8.0)
Two salario Household 0% ( 0.0)
Changes over time in absolute poverty percentages are speculative and 
qualitative as the Tete and Maputo 1988 surveys have no comparable 
predecessor or successor. On the whole it can be argued:
a. at any time since 1980 (and probably much earlier) urban absolute
poverty cannot have been much below 15%. (The quarter with no salarios 
may have been 15% when the city was much smaller and up to 1980-82 one
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salario minimal and quite attainable secondary income levels would have 
kept total household income above the absolute poverty line.);
b. absolute poverty rose from 1981 through 1983 as 5% growth gave way to
at least as large a rate of decline as a result of the war. By 1983,
it may have been 25% - 30%;
c. 1986 may have been about the same as 1983 and 1987 better because 
abastecimento availability rose replacing candonga sources and minimum 
wage/abastecimento ratios were relatively well maintained;
d. the sudden April 1988 fall in the minimum wage/abastecimento ratio 
caused a leap to 50% largely reversed by October 1988 wage increases 
and increased abastecimento take-up flexibility in early 1989;
e. little change took place in the second part of 1989 or in 1990. Some
employment gains and increased artisanal and zonas verdes sales could 
be noted. However, much of these gains went to less poor or not so 
poor households and their overall magnitude can readily be exaggerated. 
On balance there was probably a very slight fall in absolute poverty 
incidence.
This impressionistic scenario (which fits reasonably well with what some 
acute observers said at these periods) is corroborated by low birth weight 
ratios in Maputo Central Hospital. In 1980 they were 12.5% and falling, 
reaching a low of under 10% in 1981 (by no means good but not unusual in a 
low income country). By 1983 they exceeded 14% and stayed there until 1987 
when they fell to about 13% before rocketing to almost 16% in the first 
half of 1988. Over 1989-90 they reverted to 13% to 14%.
The data and its interpretation hold out several implications as to what 
can hold absolute poverty at 30%, shrink it to 20% or allow it to rise to 
50%:
a. the minimum wage/abastecimento ratio is the most dominant policy 
instrument;
b. productive machamba access is secondary but crucial for perhaps 5% of 
households near the absolute poverty line;
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c. a selective cross subsidy on unmilled or yellow maize (a nutritious, 
unpreferred but not unacceptable) recovered from higher rice and sugar 
prices might lower absolute poverty by perhaps 3% to 4% (and cases of 
serious malnutrition by more);
d. putting more goods (at full cost) into the abastecimento "fair price" 
channels (whether formally on ration or not) could be useful to low 
income households. Major examples are bread, beans and - perhaps - 
dried cassava.
However, it is unlikely that these measures(however skilfully implemented) 
can reduce absolute poverty in Maputo below 20%. The conclusions of the 
1989 World Bank Food Security Study are not dissimilar - 30% urban absolute 
poverty with a hard core of 15% near destitute.
Urban Public Services and Housing
Urban poverty goes beyond income levels to access to basic services. The 
two are inter-related: better access to health services reduces loss of 
income from illness; education (with a lag, long for primary and academic 
secondary, but less so for adult and in service specialised secondary) 
raises both social and individual productivity and earnings; pure water 
supply reduces illness and nutritional wastage (i.e. cost of any effective 
level of nutrition); transport and energy may be able to reduce urban 
transport and fuel costs in real terms. Services aspects deserve attention 
for these reasons and because PRE has sought to tighten budgetary 
constraints requiring as a matter of urgency:
a. increase in efficiency of resource use (including external assistance);
b. mobilisation of additional external support especially for selected 
recurrent cost items with special reference to health and education
(special but not unique - it might be possible to convince a Gulf state 
to donate 20,000 or 30,000 tonnes of kerosene a year for three years or 
a coal producer with surplus capacity to do the same for coal with 
sales revenues used to finance recurrent energy or other ministry 
costs);
c. viable, cost-efficient cost recovery not limiting poor household access 
to basic services needs to be explored.
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Health
Health's immediate substantive priorities are:
a. to maintain present levels of coverage and quality in Maputo and extend 
them to other cities and towns;
b. to extend coverage of priority services (e.g. MCH, immunisation) where 
take-up is known to be lower among poor households;
c. to restore real resource for preventative and community outreach 
medicine which have been falling for several years;
d. to follow on from its excellent nutrition monitoring and survey work to
a package of interventions which will be practicable, financeable and
effective and to establish a coordinating and evaluating role in
respect to all nutritional interventions in order to ensure that the 
limited actual and mobilizable resources available are devoted to 
priority ends or projects which have other justifications are clearly 
labelled as such.
Three quantitative tests of success will be:
a. a halt to the fall in consultations which appears to have begun as long 
ago as 1985 and was over 50% at many postos and centros in urban areas;
b. a continuation of the increases in MCH consultations and vaccinations;
c. a sustained fall in underweight births and growth faltering percentages 
as well as in incidence of young child malaria and "at risk" pregnant 
women/anaemia and underweight).
Available data do permit a few tentative preliminary conclusions:
a. health professional levels have held up well and overall probably grown
slightly;
b. drug imports are dramatically down on 1981 levels but significantly 
better than 1984 and on a rising trend;
c. equipment and vehicles have probably exhibited the same pattern;
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d. maintenance expenditure and domestic supply purchases have been cut 
draconically in real terms in 1985 and 1986, somewhat in 1987.
Moderate increases in 1987 and 1990 have not fully offset the cuts and 
coherent external support generation has (in contrast to drugs) yet to 
take place;
e. therefore overall resource levels have probably risen slightly since 
1985 with further increases likely in 1989;
f. but the cuts in domestic supplies (including food) and maintenance 
availability have prejudiced the efficient use of the other resources 
and, unless corrected, will do so even more in the future.
Housing
Concrete city public housing (19%) and other (81%) residents face very 
different problems.
From 1986 to 1988 rents in the concrete city are said to have risen from 
18% to 33% of occupants' average salaries. They are also said to have 
risen 100% which would imply a fall from 18% to 7%! The former data based 
on the Maputo Survey appears more accurate for 1988 and it is scarcely 
credible that 1986 rents were 75% of average occupants salaries as the 
other study seems to suggest, if one takes present actual rents paid and 
salaries received from the first study as accurate. Several fairly agreed 
facts are:
a. 1988 rents bore heavily on lower income concrete city tenants;
b. they were to a substantial degree offset by inevitable (even if
illegal) sub-letting leading to overcrowding;
c. transport charges from the canisa since 1988 fare increases and 1989
liberalisation (opening to private transporters) (together with sub­
letting) offset higher concrete city rents;
d. present rent levels at best cover administration and part of operation 
and maintenance, i.e. they are not adequate to restore and maintain the 
urban housing stock;
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e. higher rents mandated after rehabilitation under the World Bank
project, if in fact fully implemented, will force present tenants to 
stay in their interim houses as they could not afford the new levels.
Canisa housing problems are different. On the face of it construction 
costs of MT 600,000 to MT 900,000 (1988-89 prices) for simple, small 
traditional or modern material houses are prohibitive (albeit at $ 650 to 
1,100 at late 1989 exchange rates they are not absolutely particularly 
high). Yet informal and builder occupier construction does proceed and 
indeed plots are at a premium leading to sale (illegal) of machamba 
allotments as housing sites.
Water and Sanitation
Urban safe water coverage has fallen from around 50% in 1980/81 to 35% 
today because population has grown faster than facilities. In Maputo about 
20-22% have access to piped water and 10-12% to stand-pipe water. The 
source of the other 65% to 70% is unknown but is likely to be polluted 
shallow wells, unprotected and often stagnant open sources and up to 20-25% 
candonga water from water sellers. The last may come from main sources and 
be safe, but is also very such more expensive per litre than piped water, 
another case in which poor households pay more for a basic need than less 
poor households.
Water pollution, water-borne disease incidence and disease caused loss of 
ability to use nutrients reducing effective calorie intake levels by up to 
30% in extreme cases are known to exist - especially in the canisa - but 
have not been surveyed or analysed. A study to this end is now proposed by 
Water coordinating with the Nutrition Unit of the Ministry of Health.
Sanitation has also faced eroding coverage. In the late 1970s early 1980s 
a 60% level was attained in Maputo on water-borne sewage and improved 
latrines. Today water-borne is 25%, improved latrines 15% , earth latrines 
40%, unknown or no facilities 20%. This does not appear to represent loss 
of existing facilities but rapid population growth and much less rapid 
sanitation facility growth. In other cities the first two rates are 
distinctly lower.
A related problem in Maputo is the very visible build-up of both rubbish 
and garbage in both the Concreto and the Canisa. In other cities - e.g.
31
Rio de Janeiro - similar build-ups have recently been found to be causal 
factors in rising malaria morbidity and mortality rates.
The restoration of rubbish collection by the Cidade in 1989 (following 
concern over malaria case growth and the danger of cholera or other 
epidemics) is an example of action on a priority problem of special concern 
to poor people. In addition it is labour intensive with large crews 
fanning out from lorries and employs a significant per cent of women. 
However, it remains largely a concrete city service. Extending it to the 
canisa remains to be accomplished.
Agriculture
In Maputo about 30% of households have formally allotted machambas of which 
one third (10% of households) are productive as to grain (over 150 kg). At 
least another sixth (5% of households) are productive in crops other than 
grain, e.g. well watered ones are usually devoted to vegetables for sale 
and own use because under well watered conditions this use is substantially 
higher return than grain. Percentages for other towns are higher but 
probably none approaches 10 0%.
Two problems are central:
a. increasing productivity on existing non-productive machambas (up to 
half in the Maputo Green Zone) by techniques including, but not limited 
to, small scale irrigation;
b. increasing Green Zone sizes and giving preference in new machamba 
allotments to low income and especially female-headed household 
applicants (as was done in respect to new plots made usable as part of 
Dutch Water Project).
Agriculture has built up a very considerable body of knowledge on the 
Maputo Green Zone as well as of some of the others. On the first problem 
present approaches (including women's coop strengthening) appear sound. On 
the second the view - especially in respect to Maputo - that no expansion 
possibilities exist should be reassessed to determine whether some "waste" 
land within the Zone could be made productive at a reasonable cost or the 
Zone1s perimeter pushed outward.
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A corollary is to reject proposals which would encroach on machambas in 
present Zonas Verdes by turning present machainba land over to medium scale 
commercial farms. This has been under consideration in the Tete Zonas 
Verdes in an area in which machamba holders with NGO help have recently 
developed well-based small scale irrigation to make their machambas 
productive for the first time and a medium-sized commercial farming 
enterprise seeks reallocation of the improved land to it to grow vegetables 
(which it could do in a variety of reasonably secure areas near Tete but 
outside the Zonas-Verdes if it were prepared to put in its own small scale 
well or river pump irrigation).
Transport
Transport's relevance to urban absolute poverty and its reduction has two 
branches - urban passenger traffic and intra-city/peri-urban goods 
transport. (Inter-city and rural issues are considered in the parallel 
section on rural poverty).
Urban bus rates at MT 100 a ride in 1989 (MT 200 a day for a commuter from 
the canisa) are high relative to incomes (30% a month at salario minimal 
level) but without bus service people could not live there and work in the 
city centre. Further it is unlikely that they can be reduced consistent 
with enterprise viability. On balance liberalisation has increased volume 
and convenience of service, saving valuable time for low income household 
riders, but has slightly raised average costs.
A basic question for the public sector is service enhancement. The urban 
bus company has about 60 operational busses whereas roughly 260 are 
probably needed to meet demand in a city of the size, income structure and 
population of Maputo. Securing external aid for 200 busses might pose few 
problems. Keeping them supplied with spares would as would maintenance.
A three-pronged approach might be tried to this problem:
a. negotiate a five year spares commitment (including tyres, tubes and 
batteries given present local production constraints) in aid financed 
bus procurement contracts providing for four preset deliveries a year;
b. also negotiate provision of two mechanic trainers one for one year and 
one for two;
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c. recruit ex-miners who have learned basic technical and engineering
skills on the Rand and are now unemployed or not very gainfully self- 
employed in Maputo (as the Ministry of Health Eguipment Maintenance 
Unit has done successfully).
The opening of urban passenger transport to the private sector has been 
successful in Maputo. Casual observation suggests that time savings to 
workers and late arrival reduction savings for employers are significant.
So is the reduction of pressure on the public sector for unsustainable 
expansion, i.e. a mixed sector with a modest expansion of the public sector 
urban bus company (or a joint venture successor) to 100 to 120 operational 
vehicles is probably a better option given scarcity of finance and 
mechanics than a drive toward 260. Whether the private vehicle pool, 
savings and access both to rand and to South African vehicle and spares 
markets which lie behind this success exist in other cities is somewhat 
doubtful so that generalisation of results may not be attainable in the 
short term.
Energy
r
Energy's relevance to urban poverty reduction (or the reverse) relates to 
fuel and lighting costs. Here the problem is that insecurity, increasing 
population and retreating forest margins have cause wood and charcoal costs 
to sky-rocket to MT 10,000 as for 1989 for a fully adequate month's 
household supply. This hurts the poor worst as the costs of comparable 
kerosene and coal supplies would cost MT 20,000 to MT 2,500 and of 
electricity MT 1,000 to 1,250 a month but the facilities to use them are 
rarely present in the canisa.
Small scale wood-lots and agro-forestry are strategic medium term options. 
However, security conditions and pressure on land may make them unsuitable 
for Maputo. If secure areas can be found trial projects in respect to 
Beira, Nampula or Chimoio might be more promising. Until supply and access 
to wood/charcoal increases, improved wood stoves and charcoaling techniques 
- which have been developed - are unlikely to do much to mitigate the 
prohibitive level of wood-fuel prices.
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Education
Education faces challenges to maintaining its relatively high enrollment 
rate in Maputo and other major cities while halting the decline in quality 
which has marked recent years, the shortages of texts which have been one 
of the causes of qualitative deterioration and avoiding massive deaccessing 
of children of poor households by present fee and charge levels. Unlike 
Health, Education's available real recurrent resources have unmistakably 
shrunk because there has been no substantial donor support for recurrent 
budget items beyond textbooks. Recent World Bank and Scandinavian Funding 
may help reverse this as may authorisation to allocate USAID counterpart 
funds to recurrent education costs.
Quality declines in Maputo appear to have three main causes:
a. the abandonment of the pre-primary year to teach Portuguese (the 
language of instruction of which a majority of children do not 
understand on entry, i.e. those from households where the mother does 
not speak Portuguese which is a very high proportion of absolutely poor 
households) and social interrelationships, and the failure to achieve 
these goals in the first primary year;
b. the absolute scarcity and absolutely prohibitive price for poor 
households of textbooks;
c. the three shift system which gives too brief a school day - 
particularly in the context of the two previous barriers to effective 
schooling.
The results are massive repeat and dropout rates. These are so high that 
educational efficiency (measured in years taught per graduating pupil 
divided by the number of course years) is only about 20%. Even those who 
do complete do not have an adequate educational base resulting in almost 
equally high repeat and drop out rates at subsequent levels.
Industry's relevance to reduction of absolute poverty lies in job creation 
generally and small, informal, labour-intensive enterprise employment in 
particular. Related roles include increasing production and lowering real 
cost of building materials (for housing) and of producing more consumer
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goods, agricultural inputs and construction materials for the rural 
familial sector which (if deliverable) will validate and make effective 
price incentives leading to reduction in rural absolute poverty and to 
better (and possibly lower real cost) urban food supplies.
Artisanal production - probably concentrated in food processing, 
tailoring/garment making, footwear making and repair, carpentry, metal 
working, small scale construction, vehicle repair - is weak in Mozambique 
compared to other African countries including its immediate SAUCC 
neighbours. Until 1975 this related to Portuguese small enterprise policy 
and to competition from Portuguese small enterprise craftsmen. Some 
accounts suggest an expansions to 1981 reversed by war and loss of demand 
as real wages declined. Whether there has been a recovery since 1986 is 
unclear - supplies of raw materials from the countryside (normally 
important to many artisanal enterprises) remain low and erratic for 
security (or more accurately insecurity reasons) and wage earner purchasing 
power remains constricted.
More accurate or more detailed statements are not possible as no artisanal 
("informal industrial") sector survey exists. Not merely are product 
composition, markets, number of proprietors - family workers - employees, 
typical incomes, main buyers, etc. unknown; so are constraints which might 
be loosened by policy reform. These include access to raw materials and to 
markets (e.g. by "fair price" shops or Co-ops), appropriate adult training 
on a part time basis, provision of technical services (e.g. bookkeeping), 
reduction of bureaucratic rules and fees (to the extent these are enforced 
or fear of their enforcement deters production), conceivably access to 
credit via neighbourhood or craft associations. The first priority action 
is - therefore - a survey designed to find out what is, what trends are and 
what constraints could be removed or reduced now.
Commerce
Commerce's basic ministerial urban poverty roles relate to food security 
and are discussed in the next section. However it also has had the role of 
providing the basic surveys used for urban absolute poverty mapping and 
should follow them up with 1991 surveys for Maputo, Tete, a peri-urban 
rural area, and Nampula.
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The urban commercial sector is functional and relatively competitive. It 
dies not constitute a major barrier to livelihood restoration and 
improvement of absolutely poor households as does its much weaker rural 
analogue.
Small scale (petty) commerce from stall and pavements is a rather small 
proportion of poor household livelihoods in urban Mozambique compared to 
most other Sub-Saharan African countries. Why is not entirely clear but 
one reason is that lack of rural security has severed or attenuated 
urban/rural links depriving the urban petty traders of farm products and 
also of artisanal production dependent on rural raw materials. There has 
however, been visible - if limited - expansion over 1989-90 which may 
relate to improved road access from some districts to Maputo.
Food Security
Urban Food security's two main aspects are micro or household level and 
macro. The barriers to household level food security is almost totally 
financial in Maputo, dominantly so in Beira but sometimes includes 
substantial physical unavailability elements in other urban areas while the 
macro level is physical and institutional as well as financial.
The household financial access issues have already been addressed in the 
section on Prices/Incomes/Employment aspect of Urban poverty. Because the 
majority of cases turn on lack of salario incomes; inadequacy of the 
minimum wage over April 1988, February 1989; lack of a productive machamba 
and limited self-employment opportunities at levels of productivity or 
remuneration providing adequate primary and supplementary households 
incomes, the solutions must be sought primarily through reversing these 
conditions.
Targeted supplements or subsidies - as discussed in that section and in 
relation to health and education - are possible in respect to:
a. orphans (existing programme)
b. old age pensioners of modern sector (partial and expanding existing 
programme)
c. disabled persons (partial existing programme with primary emphasis on 
war victims)
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d. primary school children (limited school feeding)
e. hospital patients (proposed programme)
f. malnourished young children - basically 18 months to four years 
(attempts in progress to define programme parameters and render 
operational)
g. underweight pregnant women (as with "f" pilot work in progress)
h. underweight infants of mothers experiencing lactation problems (small 
existing programme)
i. enterprise workers with low wages and large household size (programme 
under implementation)
There is also a potential especially outside Maputo and Beira for reducing 
food costs by increasing volumes actually available at abastecimento fair 
prices which even when fully cost covering and through private retailers 
are significantly below parallel market ones. For the same reason 
introduction of additional basic foods - e.g. bread, cassava - into the 
abastecimento network might (especially in the case of bread) substitute 
fair prices for seller's market high prices, at least for those without 
access to bread at subsidised prices in their workplace.
Employment creation in economic or social infrastructure and productive 
capacity maintenance rehabilitation and expansion is government policy and 
should contribute to food security. Unfortunately to date it has been 
hampered by problems in project identification, procedure specification and 
- in particular - the 90% under-pledging of the food bank facility included 
in the 1988 Emergencia Appeal. (Similar approaches are relevant to rural 
food security.)
Physical availability problems have four main causes:
1 . the impact of war and the (not unrelated) impossibility of sustaining 
colonial large scale and settler farm production on domestic marketed 
output which has for several years been of the order of 1 0% of 
commercial and emergency requirements;
2 . donor failure to pledge, or to deliver fully and promptly on pledges, 
in respect to food aid requirements conservatively estimated at 900,000
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tonnes in 1988/89 and exceeding 1,000,000 in 1989/90 and especially the 
large shortfalls in non-grain products including sugar;
3 . logistical difficulties arising from war risk, war damage to and 
inadequate maintenance of transport infrastructure and vehicle fleets;
4 . institutional weaknesses and rigidities of commercial food sector 
enterprises (both public and private).
It remains urgent - and only proposed rather than scheduled - to act to 
bring the Beira abastecimento system's logistical capacity up to Maputo 
levels and to extend the system to two or three further major cities on a 
phased basis probably with priority to Nampula, Vila de Tete (plus Moatize) 
and Inhambane.
An aspect of food security which has received little attention is nutrient 
loss resulting from diseases related to impure water and inadequate 
sanitation. Such losses can be as great as 30%. The Ministry of Health's 
nutritional and epidemiological units lack the technical capacity to survey 
and analyse the situation (which is probably especially severe in Maputo 
but probably also affects at least Beira, Nampula, Quelimane and Inhambane) 
while the Water Department lacks the financial resources which it is now 
seeking to mobilise.
Food security - and more specifically targeted nutrition interventions - 
have suffered from a lack of coordination, designated lead ministry or 
coherent priority setting. The Nutrition Unit of Health and Food Security 
Department of Commerce have developed increasingly close coordination and 
cooperation, which is an important first step. However, targeted 
t interventions have been independently designed and promoted by a number of 
ministries without reference to Health and Commerce. This is unlikely to 
result in optimal project design and may lead to less than optimal 
prioritisation even if individual projects adopted are of some value. For 
example, full scale primary school feeding projects could easily have a 
combined annual costs of the order of MT 6,500 million (for Maputo alone, 
perhaps MT 12,000 to 15,000 for all main urban centres) which would be a 
less than optimal allocation given that primary school students are not a 
category of person particularly malnourished or at nutritional risk 
(perhaps 33% fall in this category which is at or below the over-age 
incidence in the population of Maputo).
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CHAPTER V.
RURAL ABSOLUTE POVERTY 
Prices, Income, Production
A majority of the absolutely poor are rural - indeed perhaps 90% counting 
peri-urban rural areas and over 80% even excluding them. Further, the 
proportion of rural households in absolute poverty is probably of the order 
of two-thirds versus one-third to at most one-half in urban and suburban 
areas.
Emergencia should in fact have been seen within the human dimension frame 
including urban, overall ministerial programme and less severely affected 
familial sector household aspects. The case is five fold:
1. Emergencia at present represents the bulk of the resources which are
available for rural poverty reduction/production enhancement;
2. it involves almost all Ministries and Provincial Governments in a way
which is broadly coordinated in itself and could be broadened to cover
other aspects of rural absolute poverty;
3. many Emergencia programmes are by their nature parts - and in some 
cases, e.g. secondary town and rural transport, very large parts - of 
comprehensive approaches to key rural sectors and constraints;
4. the rehabilitation (re-integration of households into production)
aspects of Emergencia require increased emphasis and coherence of
analysis both to attract less inadequate resource flows now and to 
become central when security and rural output improvement allows 
phasing down of the direct food aid and food aid logistics requirement;
5. while at the same time Emergencia rehabilitation and re-integration
projects are directly relevant to similar issues in respect of less
affected and stable rural households.
However, it may be desirable to narrow Emergencia to deal only with 
survival needs (including those of victims of natural calamities as well as 
war) for food, shelter and basic services and to logistical 
operations/institutions directly related to them. A new strategic 
programme - Rehabilitacao - would then be needed to cope with transport,
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land re-clearing, home construction, agricultural inputs and food to 
harvest needs of over 6,500,000 refugees, deslocados, afectados and 
households of demobilised combatants likely to need substantial assistance 
over the next five years. The programme would need at conceptual, 
coordination and fund mobilisation level to include basic service re­
establishment, infrastructure reconstruction and market access promotion 
elements. The programmatic case for such a division is moderately strong - 
Emergencia's capacity does not lie primarily in rehabilitation and survival 
requirements are significantly different from those of livelihood 
rehabilitation. However, the resource mobilisation case is even stronger - 
funding up to $ 250 million a year of resettlement and livelihood 
rehabilitation is unlikely to be possible from or through the emergency and 
disaster relief sections of aid agencies. For them the Mozambican 
emergency has already lasted longer than their time frame and should "run 
down" rapidly parallel to or soon after the war.
Rural absolute poverty probably changed little over 1985 to 1988. This is 
especially true if the improvements in nutrition resulting from the steady 
increase in the main (DPCCN) food aid free distribution channel flows from 
about 70,000 tonnes in 1986 to 80,000 in 1987 and nearly 200,000 in 1988 
are set to one side as not reducing vulnerability nor creating a 
sustainable base for remaining outside absolute poverty. There are rather 
mixed perceptions on the direction of change probably partly because levels 
and trends have varied widely from district to district and partly because 
post 1986 security and Emergencia logistics improvements have allowed more 
rural absolutely poor people to be reached (or to reach desplacado sites in 
Mozambique and refugees camps abroad), to be counted and to be both 
perceived to exist and (now that they can be served) become a priority call 
* on available resources.
1989-90 probably saw significant though uneven gains. This is apparently 
particularly true of Tete Province. In general the causes have been 
improved security linked with good weather and, therefore, in districts 
where either was absent no improvement took place.
Between 1980 and 1986 estimated familial sector food production in constant 
value terms fell by 25%. However, the natural increase of 15% in their 
numbers was more than offset by their declining from - say - 90% to 55% of 
the rural population assuming dislocated and affected total rises represent
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more access and better data not a radical change in truly stable 
households. Assuming that they accounted for 80% of self-provisioning 
output in 1986 (15% by peri-urban, 5% by afectados and deslocados) that 
implies a per household food output ration of .8 (.75) = . 6 divided by 1.15 
(.55) = .6325 or about 95%. If true this would suggest that less affected 
and stable rural households were - in respect to self-provisioning income - 
not radically worse off than in 1986 than in 1988. Unfortunately that 
assumption is clearly unsafe. The estimates are necessarily speculative 
even though based on a plausible model and appear to take less than 
adequate account of the decline in numbers of productive rural households. 
Taking account of partial dislocations (e.g. moves to Beira and Tete 
corridors) a more likely estimate of food output for own use fall would 
seem to be 20% per household over 1980-86.
Sale of crops by familial sector households fell (in constant price terms) 
about 80%. Adjusting as above for population changes and for 10% of 
commercialised output being from peri-urban cashew growing (or at any rate 
collection) gives a 72% per capita fall. In the absence of contrary 
evidence, a similar fall in incomes from livestock sales would appear to bet
a reasonable estimate. Artisanal fishing sales have almost certainly risen 
significantly for the relatively small number of households with access to 
fishable water, a canoe and a market (perhaps five to 1 0% of this sub­
sector) .
Remittance incomes had fallen (whether from urban and plantation Mozambique 
or from South Africa) in terms of number of households benefiting and - 
except for parallel market or goods remitted rand - in purchasing power per 
income.
Other non-farm cash incomes have probably fallen in real per household 
terms by 70 to 80% since both casual rural employment and non-agricultural 
(including livestock and fish production) goods sold by familial sector 
households appear quite limited.
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What this means for overall household incomes in unclear. If one assumes 
the total familial sector cash and self-provisioning income in 1980 was:
then in 1986 it would have declined about 35% below its 1980 per household 
real level.
Familial sector households in Portuguese African colonies were notoriously 
poor and ill-nourished (as indeed was Portugal's own metropolitan familial 
sector which also depended heavily on injections of migrant remittances). 
Over 1974/75 - 1980/81 there were probably self-provisioning gains but 
losses on cash sales (rapid deteriorisation of rural trading system only 
very partially restored) and on remittances (RSA reductions of migrant 
numbers). At best in 1980 the average familial household was slightly 
worse or about the same off as in 1973/4. Thus a 1989 estimate of 50% 
absolute poverty is conservative. The high typical malnutrition figures 
tend to bear out this contention just as their scatter supports the 
contention of very different levels and types of change from district to 
district.
Equally it is clear that PRE has had, and could have to date, a very 
limited effect on the incomes in real terms of these households. Cashew 
nut growers have responded because they could (trees were still there, nuts 
could be collected by day) and because additional goods supplies gave 
reality to the otherwise theoretical incentive of a higher grower price. 
Most other rural households have not been so well situated albeit some 
maize growers in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula, Zambezia, Tete and Manica 
clearly were able to produce and sell more and presumably had access to 
goods to buy with the proceeds. Similarly transport availability and 
security over 1989/90 benefited some growers in Gaza and Inhambane 
provinces. But one is talking of small totals - e.g. in 1989 - 19,000 
tonnes more maize worth at grower prices about $1 . 9  million in a sector 
comprising 800,000 odd households.
The present barriers to recovery by this sector and especially its 
absolutely poor households are easy to sketch:
Self-provisioning 
Agricultural sales 
Remittances 
Other
70% - 75% 
10% - 15% 
10%
5%
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lack of seeds, tools, livestock, household equipment or money to buy 
them (even when actually available) by many (most?) absolutely poor 
households in the familial sector and the lack of a parallel to or 
extension in coverage of Emergencia's deslocado/afectado economic 
rehabilitation programme to cover them;
lack of market access because of deteriorated or destroyed transport 
infrastructure and vehicle (including small and cabotage vessel) fleets 
limiting not only familial household access to small towns but equally 
movement from many of these to larger towns and provincial capitals. 
Again Emergencia is tackling this gap in logistical and infrastructural 
components basically designed to get grain to deslocados and afectados. 
These do serve some stable familial sector households if they are near 
or en route to deslocado and afectado concentrations. But without 
integration into a national rural and small town transport programme it 
can hardly be a coherent or complete approach to this sector's 
transport constraint;
lack of access to a well-articulated network of buyers has been a 
problem since the Portuguese exodus albeit recent improvements in 
security and post 1983 liberalisation of authorised buyers may now be 
improving this slowly;
lack of access to physical inputs plus research and extension is a 
continuing problem. Services to the sector familial (with a few 
localised or personalised exceptions) had little place in Portuguese 
policy (albeit the rural trading net did stock some inputs). The 
initial Mozambican emphasis on saving the large and medium scale 
enterprise/commercial far sub-sector de facto continued this sector 
familial blind approach. Communal production villages were unpopular 
and in theory diverted resources from the sector familial but were so 
thin on the ground and so little supported as to suggest very little 
actual impact. Policy shifts since 1980 and especially 1983 have had 
nearly negligible results because of the direct effects of war and its 
erosion of foreign exchange and fiscal resources. Further donor 
controlled as well as funded large scale, low coverage enclaves have 
engrossed most resource flows at the same time that they generated 
them. The opportunity cost of concentration of resources into even the 
less unsatisfactory of these - e.g. MONAP - may be high and the
marginalisation of national field and strategic level personnel has 
been gravely decapacitating, but many of the resources were not 
fungible so to date the loss is more in terms of lost opportunities 
than of actual damage. Emergencia's experience - beyond seed and hand- 
tools - is limited and has encountered resource mobilisation problems. 
Research and extension - given the always weak familial sector data 
base and Agriculture's inability to update let alone expand it since 
Independence - probably needs a household survey (if only in selected 
districts) to articulate priority problems and themes;
5 . lack of goods to buy (inputs, consumer goods, building materials) make 
price incentives meaningless in many districts. The EEC cashew nut and 
hopefully its Mueda Plateau grain projects which include such goods as 
well as inputs, buyers and transport show that if this element is 
provided initial results can be achieved rapidly for some crops in some 
districts; Emergencia by its nature does not provide experience or a 
base in this segment of agricultural rehabilitation;
6 . lack of adequate prices was an increasing problem over 1980-86.
Because the Portuguese buying/trading network did exploit, until 1980 
post independence grower prices may have been adequate. 1987/89 ones 
appear reasonable relative to retail and border prices but on present 
data this cannot be asserted too confidently on a crop by crop or 
district by district basis. Further, the transport and marketing cost 
margins used in border price calculations are alarmingly high even in 
cases in which security does not appear to be the main cause. In any 
case until the other five problems are tackled to some effect price 
changed alone (which on World Bank evidence explain only about 10% of
* differential agricultural production growth in Africa) cannot be
expected to result in rapid output/income increases.
The basic requirement for serious struggle against absolute poverty is not 
to devise programmes only for absolutely poor households. Rather it is to 
ensure that they (and especially female headed households) are visible to 
programme articulators and operators and are represented in participation 
(especially in design) so that they do share in/have access to services, 
markets and benefits rather than being overlooked while the not so poor and 
less poor benefit.
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Rural Service Deterioration And Revival
Rural poverty has been significantly affected by the deterioration of rural 
service quality and coverage since 1981. This is true of its social 
dimensions, future prospects and to some extent present output levels (the 
sick cannot work and require healthy person time to tend them, time spent 
watering because rural improved well/stand-pipe coverage is about 13% 
cannot be used to grow crops).
The cause of this negative trend - which reverses a very substantial
achievement in these fields over 1976-81 - is obvious: war and war-caused
budgetary and foreign exchange constraints. PRE to date may not have had a
significant negative effect albeit reports of class and even school
closings because of Provincial Budgetary constraints are alarming. What 
PRE will do - unless substantial external recurrent as well as 
rehabilitation finance can be mobilised from external sources on grant or 
near grant terms - is to prevent restoration of either coverage or quality 
(except for projects covered in Emergencia) let alone progress toward full 
coverage.
Cost recovery in its traditional cash fee form - except perhaps for some 
aspects of rural water - cannot play a significant role in service 
restoration either for absolutely poor households (about two thirds) or the 
rural areas as a whole. Too few people can afford to pay even minimal 
amounts until they can restore both household self-provisioning production 
an cash incomes. De facto if not always formally this seems to have been 
recognised for the familial sector as well as deslocados and afectados 
although it is less clear in respect of the peri-urban rural sector some of
whose households probably can afford to pay as much as the urban not so
poor as indeed can limited number of sector familial households with crops
to sell and buyers to whom to sell them.
Health
The medium term problem is one of coverage. About 1,120 primary health 
care units (urban and rural) now exist versus perhaps 350-400 urban and 
2,000 to 2,500 rural needed for complete coverage. Because of armed bandit 
priority target of health facilities the number of inhabitants per facility 
has been rising since 1983 and the recent budgetary constraints (and low 
donor support) have meant that from 1986 through 1988 on primary unit
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rebuilding and rehabilitation fell behind armed bandit destruction though 
this has been reversed largely because bandit facility destruction rates 
have fallen by over 80%.
In terms of total health contacts (consultations, MCH visits, 
immunizations) at least a trebling of present numbers would appear needed 
for one to assume attainment of minimum adequate coverage. This implies at 
least a doubling of medical professionals and substantial increases in 
pharmaceuticals, other supplies, vehicles and spares (plus fuel) and 
maintenance funding.
Present rural health coverage is perhaps 50%. It is higher in the peri 
urban, deslocado and afectado sub-sectors and - ironically - apparently 
lower in the less affected and stable familial sector. The reason for this 
paradox is the greater ease and security of access to peri urban residents, 
deslocados and afectados huddled near towns and in the latter two cases 
some Emergencia and related technical assistance funding. That said,
Health has the broadest rural presence of any Ministry.
Resource utilisation efficiency is a critical in rural as in urban areas.
So are better information flows and in particular the development of a drug 
and supply stock, flow, use, wastage, inappropriate use and unmet demand 
identifying reporting system.
Water
Because of lower population density, health (and nutrition) risks for 
improper sanitation and impure water supply may be less in sector familial 
than in canisa, suburban and peri-urban rural areas. Little is known of 
present conditions: latrine use is probably down on its early 1980s high
of 40%. Improved/pure water coverage within 500 metres has been raised but 
only to 13% of rural residents. This gain seems to relate largely to an 
ill coordinated set of projects under the Emergencia rubric. Natural pure 
water sources may raise this over 25%. In many areas long walks (one way 
with heavy loads) are necessary (and a heavy burden on women's and girl's 
time) to secure even limited supplies of impure water.
Education
Like Health, Education has seen its rural coverage - both as to undestroyed 
classrooms and enrollment at primary level - decline. From 1984 onward
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war-damage to schools and inaccessibility of many pupils have reversed 
progress toward full primary education cover. In some provinces rural 
enrollment fell by over 50% between 1981 and 1986-88.
The initial 1988 national education model posited constant national primary 
enrollment to the mid-1990s based on recent past trends. However, that 
would (as was not realised) imply continuing rapid rises in urban and rapid 
declines in rural enrollment. Such a result would not be consistent with 
rural rehabilitation and recovery - nor with stated governmental 
priorities. Therefore thinking out strategic revision (perhaps involving 
static urban and rising rural enrollments) is in progress.
Housing
Rural housing is in general inadequate as to space and quality albeit this 
varies sharply from area to area and the average standard is probably not 
worse than - and the crowing less bad than - in low-income Ganisa housing. 
Exceptions exist in areas of severe war-stress where several households are 
crammed into one surviving house or households camp out at night for safety 
reasons.
Costs are lower because most materials and constructions are gathered and 
carried out by the householders, sometimes on a community mutual co­
operation basis. Therefore, the possibility of and need for direct 
intervention including job creation appears low. The variety of standards 
and of uses of the same basic materials suggest that research into improved 
traditional designs and use of traditional materials would be desirable but 
this hardly seems an immediate priority.
Fuel
Most rural households are self-fuelling. The cost of fuel is time of 
collection which may or may not be a heavy burden on women's time 
budgets/workloads (and thus on ability to produce food, care for the sick, 
or collect water). If the household is in a relatively densely settled 
area with tree and bush areas over a mile away, but not otherwise, a real 
problem does exist exacerbating the weakness of labour scarce (usually 
female-headed) households.
The most promising approach to this aspect of poverty also offers an 
opportunity to raise rural cash incomes including those of absolutely-poor
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households. It is promotion of household and/or small co-operative, 
community or household wood lots of fast-growing trees appropriate to the 
locality first to provide an accessible own or local use source of fuel- 
wood and building poles and second to provide a secondary source of cash 
income through sales to town and cities. The co-op route might also be 
appropriate for small, technically efficient kilns for conversion of fuel- 
wood to charcoal which is a preferred urban fuel and more cost-efficient to 
transport.
A sole focus on energy (fuel) may not be appropriate in all cases. 
Successful household or small community level agro-forestry (silviculture) 
usually requires a mix of trees providing fuel, building materials, fodder, 
household food and food for sale. Which are appropriate depends both on 
household needs and past patterns of production and on knowledge of 
technical possibilities - e.g. for new varieties which have been locally 
tested, for provision of seeds or seedlings, for care to maturity. Seeking 
to impose single tree, single purpose wood lots as a complete strategy in 
all cases (rather than to offer support for it as a component in some) is a 
standard error in many SSA reafforestation and wood fuel programmes - 
especially where these have turned on massive plantations in ecologically 
dubious zones (e.g. near Maputo).
Transport
The crucial negative impact of transport gaps on rural poverty and the 
absence of any coherent rural transport policy (beyond the piece in 
Emergencia for facilitate inward movement of relief supplies) has been 
cited in the previous section.
The problems to identifying such a strategy include:
a. limited analysed and systematised data on intra-city through rural road 
conditions (with special reference to bridges) and repair costs;
b. an overlay map (or analogue) relating rural roads to present and 
potential agricultural production to identify economic priorities among 
such roads;
c. an estimation of the current operational and repairable lorry fleet by 
size, location, ownership and uses (e.g. intro-urban, sub/peri-urban,
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inter-city long distance, international, urban to rural and intro- 
rural) and an analogue for lorries;
d. from a-b-c- an estimate of priority route and fleet restoration costs 
which by another "overlay" with Emergencia could be used to identify 
remaining priority projects for which finance needed to be mobilised;
e. a parallel exercise in respect to small and medium (down to third 
grade) ports which can provide access to about a third of the rural 
population when combined with fairly short road trips. Again 
infrastructure (landing stages, cranes, godowns rehabilitation or 
rebuilding) and floating stock (cabotage and passenger vessels plus 
artisanal sailing and rowing craft) requirements, stocks, cost of gap 
closing and coverage in Emergencia require assessment to set out the 
balance of the priority programme which might also include provisioning 
Tete and restoring access to Zambezi River familial communities by 
Chinde-Tete small barge service.
f. rebuilding the local level, largely private rural commercial network of 
produce buyers, transporters, input and consumer goods suppliers needed 
to link rural households with main towns and commercial channels.
Rural transport costs are too high - worsening effective terms of trade by 
reducing rural selling and increasing rural buying prices. Part of this is 
security caused, part by poor infrastructure conditions which increase 
vehicle wear and tear and some by limited lorry fleet (and cabotage 
passenger lack of alternative ways to many destinations) allowing very high 
private sector prices - perhaps two times official public sector company 
ones. Seeking to cut costs by order will not work and doing so by petrol 
or spares subsidies would be fiscally unattainable. In the public sector 
better vehicle control and more intensive use (reduction of down and 
waiting time) could reduce costs but needs a myriad of small steps 
(including staff retraining) over two to three years to achieve. However, 
infrastructure restoration and fleet (of lorries and vessels) expansions 
might well cause increases in rural and inter-city connecting route 
transport costs to rise less rapidly than inflation or grower prices.
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Agriculture
Because the key to rural absolute poverty reduction, rural food self- 
sufficiency and national percentage of urban provisioning from domestic 
sources plus restoration of exports and of domestic manufacturing and 
processing agricultural raw material sources is raising rural - and 
probably familial sector in particular - production Agriculture is a key 
Ministry.
Unfortunately - as sketched in the previous section - it has been unable to 
have effective access to many rural areas for at least five years and has 
never had an adequate data base especially in respect to the familial 
sector. Further, many large scale rural schemes have become increasingly 
donor driven and operated, marginalising ministry activities while the 
activities of empresas and the cotton and cashew authorities have not been 
coordinated into any overall strategic frame.
Priority District Programme
The Priority District Programme is independent Mozambique's first 
articulated, phased strategic initiative toward creating an expanding 
dynamic of increases in production by and services to the sector familial. 
Of necessity - given personnel, resources and physical access - it would 
start in a limited number of districts with an early (say year 3) target of 
the 40 districts with over half the rural population and the best prospects 
for short term results and a longer term (say year 8 ) of reaching all 
districts.
Because infrastructure - services - production expansion need to grow in 
s parallel for any to be attainable, or at least sustainable, coordinated 
action is envisaged. Because history with enclave, donor run projects is 
bad neither parallel government multi purpose institutions nor large 
numbers of foreign personnel at strategic planning or local operational 
level are envisaged. Because both contextual divergence and sector 
familial participation in design and monitoring require it, 
decentralisation is seen as crucial. Because District level personnel are 
thin on the ground (perhaps 150-250 per District on average) and few are 
highly trained, operational coordination and provision of technical 
services would need to be Provincially based.
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For a series of programme inputs to be focussed on the same districts with 
linked times frames and sequences and for them also to be decentralised 
requires coordination from District, through Provincial to National level 
albeit preferably primarily by working parties of senior operational unit 
personnel serviced by small Planning Directorate Secretariats provincially 
and nationally. A check list of programmatic components (based on district 
level surveys and a subsequent conceptualization Working Party study) 
includes:
a. timely access to agricultural inputs and tools;
b. strengthened access to commercial units (private or public) which are 
able to buy, sell and transport;
c. enhanced agricultural extension services more closely related to sector 
familial needs and capacities;
d. restoration and extension of access to primary and adult education, 
accessible pure water supplies and primary health programming (APEs,
MCH clinics, immunization, posto and centro basic curative);
r
e. rebuilding or repair of basic rural infrastructure for transport, basic 
services and administration (including staff housing);
f. development of secondary income possibilities, not least use of labour 
intensive, seasonal techniques hiring sector familial members to carry 
out the infrastructure work;
g. flexible attention to localities or household groups (notable female 
headed households) with special requirements.
Refining PDP to a form which is implementable, technically sound and 
financeable without narrowing it into a string of high cost per household 
benefited, limited access, enclave projects or dissipating it into a 
handful of uncoordinated, parallel programmes in different sets of 
districts has - over 1989/90 - proven distinctly difficult. Further delay 
will gravely prejudice the possibility of major breakthroughs against rural 
absolute poverty in the first half on the 1990s.
Rehabilitacao has already been sketched above. Its agricultural aspects 
would need to centre on timely provision of tools (to clear long abandoned
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fields and rebuild destroyed hoes as well as to plant and till), inputs 
(especially seeds) and food until harvest (9 to 18 months after return 
depending on timing of return and amount of clearing required). Extension 
would, at that stage, probably be less crucial than in the PDP because 
these will largely be literally returnees - to own districts, homes, farms 
and previously functional (at least to ensure survival) techniques of 
production.
Rural Food Security
The rural food security crisis has three distinct aspects: physical
availability, macro financial availability and household access through 
production or purchase. All are distinctly unsatisfactory and vulnerable 
to localised or broader breakdowns which, unless speedily corrected, would 
lead to direct famine deaths (as opposed to high death rates from diseases 
related to, or fatal because of, the presence of malnutrition). In fact 
what is surprising is that famine (except in respect to those enslaved by 
the bandidos armados or in totally isolated areas) has been averted since 
1983 by the combined efforts of the Government of Mozambique, the 
international community and - especially - the Mozambique sector familial.
Rural food supply as of 1988 appears to have been 60 to 70% familial sector 
self-provisioning (including partial self-provisioning by some deslocados, 
almost all afectados and most peri-urban rural households), 30% by 
Emergencia free distribution and perhaps five to 10% by commercial sales 
(largely in peri urban areas). It is necessary to bear in mind that the 
aggregate supply is not over 70% of the minimum desirable level of 
calorific intake so that the ratio of self provisioning to need is under 
50%. Without massive food injections there would be widespread deaths 
consequential on starvation.
The physical access constraints on the household sector share of supply 
relate primarily to the war and its consequences:
1 . physical insecurity of many rural areas (especially at night);
2 . the consequential creation of an artificial land shortage limiting 
production by at least half the rural population;
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3. the forced flight of some 6 million people into deslocados, afectado 
and peri-urban rural settlements virtually none of which have adequate 
safe land access to be fully self-provisioning;
4. lack of adequate resources for rehabilitation and reintegration of 
dislocated, severely affected and even less severely affected into 
production (in the physical as well as macro and household financial 
senses);
5. radical destruction and/or deterioration of rural infrastructure.
Rural household food security turns in part on production for most 
households, virtually all except deslocados. For perhaps half the rural 
population it is 100%, for another third 30% to 75% and for a sixth under 
30% and in these cases usually under 10%. The constraints on household 
production have been discussed above in relation to rural incomes.
The responses to the overall physical and household income access security 
issues turn on reviving food production and rehabilitating rural households 
in a process of restoring their productive capacity as discussed in the two 
previous sections. A secondary consideration - which can however be large 
in adverse weather years especially in the three Southern provinces and 
parts of Tete and Nampula - is crop failure related to drought, flood 
typhoon, ill-distributed rainfall or excess heat at certain points in the 
growing cycle. This, however, requires the same Emergencia plus 
Rehabilitacao type response as the war situation but on a smaller, less 
general and shorter duration basis (i.e. the issues which confronted the 
pre-Emergencia Provincial Calamities Commissions).
Macro financial security can in the longer term only be secured by 
restoring domestic self-provisioning capacity first at district and then at 
provincial, zonal and national levels supplemented by export recovery to 
make at least modest commercial imports possible. In the short run it 
depends on sustaining not merely the recent past levels of food aid at 
around 500,000 tonnes a years, but also raising the level to nearer the 
1,000,000 tonne (perhaps 600-650,000 rural directed) level now needed for 
actual national food security at barely acceptable nutritional levels.
Over 1991-92 domestic production gains can hardly reduce that requirement 
to under 900,000 tonnes a year. 1990-91 is, at best, likely to be a 
mediocre crop year. Rapid improvements in security, if they occur as
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hoped, will result in the return of up to 500,000 refugees (over the two 
years) most of whom will require food support for 9 to 18 months while they 
clear long abandoned fields and bring a crop to harvest while a similar lag 
will occur before most afectados and deslocados returning home can regain 
substantial output levels.
Physical availability for aid and commercial food supplies in rural areas 
turns on military security, transport infrastructure, vehicle fleet and 
institutional capacity rehabilitation and expansion. Inputs into these 
programmes, except for military security, do appear in Emergencia appeals 
but have in general been notably underfunded with respect to all items 
except short term logistical support (fuel, spares) and to a lesser extent 
vehicles and with minor port and - at least until 1988 - cabotage fleet 
restructuring notably ill-supported.
CHAPTER VI.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: MACRO
A.
The purpose of poverty and human condition mapping cannot be primarily 
academic - the need to know more is primarily to allow action to be 
informed by knowledge. Nor, in the context of human condition crises as 
severe and absolute poverty levels as high as in Mozambique, can all action 
be suspended until optimal data collection, interpretation and analysis is 
achieved.
In fact, the present state of knowledge does identify a set of policy 
implications and priorities, only one of which is collecting, analysing, 
interpreting and coordinating more data. Some of the policy implications 
are general, others relate to specific sectors and/or ministries.
Enabling Higher Production And Incomes
The role of earned income in avoiding or escaping from absolute poverty at 
the household level is central. In urban areas (and, with the return of 
security, in rural areas as well) probably 85 to 90% of households could 
earn incomes above the minimum necessary to avoid absolute poverty were
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employment and reasonably productive self-employment opportunities open to 
them. Therefore, increasing levels and productivity of employment/self- 
employment and ensuring that - especially for low income groups - it is 
fairly remunerated, is central to any serious strategy for reducing 
absolute poverty in Mozambique.
Policy implications of special significance from a human dimension aspect 
include:
1. Minimum wage setting to defend real purchasing power in terms of basic 
consumer goods (and especially food). Failure to achieve this between 
the April 1, 1988 basic food price doubling and the payment of the 
minimum wage increases promulgated at the end of October 1988 very 
substantially increased urban absolute poverty and may have virtually 
doubled it.
2. Similar defence of real producer prices for agricultural commodities in 
the basic food, industrial input and export categories so that the 
familial sector can meet its basic needs for inputs, consumer goods and 
foods (e.g. sugar) it cannot produce and services. Not
r
inconsequentially this is also necessary for industrial sector demand 
expansion and thus for growth in urban wage employment.
3. Expansion of employment/self-employment levels both through policies 
leading to macroeconomic expansion and more selective measures.
Building and infrastructural rehabilitation should be organised on a 
labour intensive basis (as has not been true in Mozambique, and 
especially urban Mozambique, over the past four decades). Where 
feasible, economically and socially viable projects of this kind should 
be organised so as to provide supplementary urban and seasonal rural 
employment (as, for example, in Ghana's PAMSCAD and several ILO pilot 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa).
4. Agricultural output and commercialisation capacity (including access to 
inputs, to transport, to buyers and to goods to purchase plus extension 
services as well as to security and remunerative nominal prices) must 
be increased. This is essential to increase household and national 
food self-sufficiency and to expand both the market for urban sector 
production and the levels of export earnings. Action needed includes 
raising access to and productivity of Zonas Verdes and other peri-urban
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machambas to supplement low-income household direct food suppliers 
and/or cash earning for urban - especially female headed - households.
5 . Basic service access is of direct relevance to raising earned income. 
Health (especially but not only preventative) services and pure water 
reduce sick time and increase ability to work hard while education 
increases average and individual productivity - albeit except for adult 
education with a time lag between investment and output.
Related to the general earned income expansion imperative is the shorter 
term one of managing emergencia and rehabilitation programmes to maximise 
opportunities for low-income households to increase their earned incomes:
1 . rehabilitation related temporary and seasonal jobs;
2 . access to machambas for urban households with a bias in favour of 
allocation to low-income households (especially female headed ones 
without a salario) and of increasing productivity on the one-half to 
two-thirds now classed as "non-productive" (less than 150 kg of grain 
per year).
3. Using aid raw material supplies and government contracts to increase 
productive capability and market access of labour intensive, small- 
scale service (e.g. repair) and manufacturing enterprises.
A parallel role in social condition improvement and absolute poverty 
reduction is in provision of basic services (especially primary health 
care, primary-technical-adult education, pure water, familial and small 
enterprise extension services) which are physically available, adequate in 
quality and accessible in cost to poor households. This requires:
1 - extension of coverage to provincial capitals other towns and secure 
rural areas to bring them closer to the coverage and quality levels of 
Maputo;
2 - rehabilitation of services in less secure and newly secured rural zones 
to restore the interrupted 1977-81 dynamics toward full national 
accessibility;
2 • improving managerial and cost-efficiency to lower unit costs and 
facilitate quantity expansion and quality bettering;
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B.
Coordination And Integration
If absolute poverty is seen as a major structural imbalance and its 
reduction as a strategic priority, then struggling against it cannot be 
relegated to a few peripheral projects - nor even to one or two large 
programmes isolated from the rest of the budgetary and public process:
a. small projects will not accomplish much given the scope of the 
challenge;
b. isolated programmes are unsuitable except for emergency survival 
activities (and even there, their isolation limits them) because 
enabling poor households to produce more and creating a capacitating 
climate of services, infrastructure and market access to support that 
enabling inherently includes tasks which are (or ought to be) part of 
the work of every Ministry, Province and District;
c. thus an isolated programme will fail either for lack of adequate 
support by other governmental institutions or by trying to duplicate 
and oust them from their functions in respect of absolutely poor 
people;
d. the latter is particularly inappropriate because - with some 
significant exceptions - the main requirement is not creating 
programmes for absolutely poor households, excluding all others, but to 
ensure that absolutely poor households do have access to basic 
services, to infrastructure, to markets, to inputs necessary to 
increase productivity.
Therefore, if the struggle to reduce absolute poverty is to be won, then it 
must be understood and waged by each Ministry, Province and District. In 
other words the principles outlined in this paper need to be understood, 
used in formulating policies and programmes and acted on throughout the 
public service if they are to be real guide-lines toward development and 
not yet another forgotten essay on planning and development concepts with 
little relationship to actual practice.
Integration of the struggle to reduce absolute poverty into the normal 
governmental working process is a condition for real success. For example,
60
ensuring that urban rehabilitation, services like refuse collection and 
rural works are organised on a labour intensive basis and that there is 
effective access to such jobs for women; checking that proposed service fee 
or input charge levels do not exclude absolutely poor urban worker (formal 
or "informal" sector) and rural ones do not exclude the poorer half of 
sector familial households.
But integration in many institutions cannot by itself result in a unified 
approach - except by very good luck. This is especially true because of 
the high degree of decentralisation to Provinces and the obstacles to 
frequent communication, especially to district level. Coordination is 
equally important.
Coordination has three aspects or levels:
a. in respect to major strategy, programme and policy decisions it rests 
with the Council of Ministers and the Planning Commission;
b. in respect to cross-sectoral (or ministerial) coordination and 
articulation it rests with the National Directorate of Planning;
c. and within sectors it rests with the unit of the Ministry responsible 
for planning and programme development acting together with the 
Provincial directorates.
In this context the SDA-Project is somewhat mis-titled. It is a means to 
increase the coordinating capacity of the NDP, to provide it with analysis 
of poverty and how it can be reduced and evaluation of proposed policies, 
programmes and projects. The funds it has for actual projects are very 
limited and intended to support small pilot projects to develop broader 
scale approaches which can then be funded through the main stream budgetary 
process.
C.
Budgetary Coordination, Limitation, Allocation
Mozambique has very limited public finance resources and the bulk of them 
are received from donors. Overall government expenditure is of the order 
of $ 85 per capita if the Recurrent, Capital and Emergency Budgets are
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combined and direct to project or commodity aid not now passing through the 
budgetary process added to them.
In absolute per capita terms $ 85 is very small. It is about 60% of the 
$ 140 a year per capita which the World Bank's Long Term Perspective Study 
strongly implies is the minimum expenditure needed for basic service, 
infrastructural investment and general administration. Unfortunately $ 85 
is very high relative to Mozambique's GDP of perhaps $ 150 per capita. On 
that basis it is over 55% of GDP whereas the LTPS target is about 35%. 
Further, of the Mozambican governmental/Emergencia expenditure of $ 1,275 
million, of the order of 65 to 70% represents external grants and loans.
There is no simple way to raise the $ 85 toward $ 140 nor to reduce the 
external support required from 65 - 70% to a more acceptable level of 25 - 
30%. Over 1990-95 there is little reason to project either domestic or 
external governmental revenue growth at over 5% a year. And, if over that 
period, most of the 1,500,000 refugees from war return, resident population 
could well grow 4.5% a year. That would imply $ 87 per capita in 1990 
prices in 1995.
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Therefore, improved allocation must be a central means of increasing 
funding available for priority uses. Improved allocation does mean greater 
efficiency in terms of progress toward priority objectives. It does not 
mean cost cutting in the normal sense - priority recurrent programmes do 
have possibilities for getting more out of present allocations (as noted in 
the following sectoral chapter) but they also need more resources - not 
less.
At present Mozambique's government sector - as a result of war - spends 
about 350% of LTPS implicit norms on emergency survival and about 450% of 
them on defence. Other recurrent expenditure and capital expenditure are 
only 36% of those norms (Table V).
With peace (however achieved) radical shifts in allocation:
a. from Emergencia to Rehabilitacao
b. from Defence to Other Recurrent
c. within Capital from rebuilding war damage to permanent rehabilitation 
and expansion
would become possible cumulatively over time.
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These (Table VI) could take both Capital and Other Recurrent from 36% to 
61% of LTPS norms. That would be a significant improvement. To achieve 
it, however, requires convincing donors to switch support from Emergencia 
to Rehabilitacao as the need for the former and the possibility for the 
latter rise, and, similarly, to maintain a rising trend of support for 
capital and general recurrent spending.
However, there are more painful choices to be made under the allocation 
rubric. Some large capital intensive projects are needed - e.g. 
rehabilitation of the three main rail corridors and the ports of Beira and 
Maputo. But if PDP and similar initiatives are to be funded some existing 
or proposed projects, e.g. in respect to large scale irrigation, will need 
to be dropped. Similarly even in priority areas a set of hard decisions 
will be needed on possible speed of expansion, e.g. universal primary 
education and universal access to full posto/centro level health care 
cannot be funded (or staffed) by 1995.
But effective allocation requires a more coordinated and transparent 
budgetary process than now exists:
a. bringing all foreign project support and counterpart funds on budget 
(both as to sources and uses);
b. recasting Ministerial (and Provincial Directorate) accounts in ways 
that would tell more about spending by programme and by type of 
expenditure (e.g. operating supplies, fuel-spares-vehicles, training);
c. development of at least rough price indices for each type of
expenditure to allow constant price (real input) comparisons to be made
among years with some degree of accuracy;
d. carrying out a budgetary exercise analogous to the Recurrent and 
Capital Budgets for Emergencia;
e. producing - primarily for planning and allocation of resources
purposes, not day to day recording and control of spending - a
consolidated budget (sources and uses table) for Recurrent - Emergencia 
- Capital;
f. allocating resources to priority programmes first and then working out 
the optimal sub-allocations to Recurrent, Capital and Emergencia (and
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possibly to Rehabilitacao if some elements in it are financed 
separately from standard Recurrent programmes).
These are areas in which Planning and Finance - as the central economic 
policy and resource allocation coordination and determination bodies - need 
to take the lead. However, a comparable exercise is needed within (and 
would be valuable to each Ministry and Province. In two respects, indeed, 
these units need to take the lead:
a. in spelling out quantitative goals to be achieved as a result of 
policies and of expenditures both ex ante (sought) at the time of the 
Annual Budget exercise and ex post (achieved) within six months of the 
close of the fiscal year;
b. in relating capital projects to recurrent operations (both as to goals 
and costs) and in providing specific identification of projects needed 
to implement proposed Recurrent Budget programmes.
D.
Broadening Community Support
Mozambique needs more domestic revenue both to increase government capacity 
to fund programmes (e.g. MCH, agricultural extension) and projects (e.g. 
Nampula Hospital, Cahora Basa-Maputo power transmission line). The present 
tax levels are relatively high. Raising them further would have 
significant potential negative effects - on professional, skilled and 
business personnel's morale if via direct taxes, and on low income group 
consumption levels if via indirect. Basically, increased tax revenue will 
need to be achieved out of increased commercialised production, more 
effective collection of existing taxes and rationalisation of the indirect 
tax system.
Therefore, a case exists for broader community/user support for public 
services going beyond the tax system proper. The arguments usually 
advanced - notably in the Bamako Declaration of African Ministers of Health 
on how to achieve Health For All By The Year 2000 - include, but are not 
limited to enhancing resources available:
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a_ broadening the revenue base in a way which causes increased service use
(e.g. households supplied with water, patients treated, students 
enroled) to cause an automatic increase in revenue;
b. demonstrating to users the direct link between their paying and the
services they receive; thereby
c. broadening interest in and concern with the guality and appropriateness
of the services; and
d. because service providers are now more directly dependent on users
increasing the degree of user participation in service programme design
and monitoring and of provider accountability directly to users and
their communities.
These goals are, in themselves, sound. However, the standard instrument
used to attempt to attain them is that of centrally set fees, collected
from individual users locally and wholly or largely remitted to the centre.
That approach has a number of problems:
a. small fees are very cost inefficient to collect, bring to book and
account for - especially if the receipts have to go up to Provincial or
Ministry level. At a rough estimate 60% of the gross collection for MT 
100 fees would be needed for collecting/accounting for them. The 
personnel requirements also pose problems as specialised professionals' 
time (e.g. nurses, teachers) is not well allocated to petty cash 
collection, storekeepers do not know bookkeeping and bookkeepers are a 
scarce resource;
b. fixed fees are regressive as to income (i.e. bear most heavily on poor 
persons) unlike taxes (including indirect taxes which are progressive 
(bear less heavily on poor households) up to an income level well above 
the absolute poverty line;
c. experience has shown that even modest fee levels reduce the use made of 
(access to) services by poor and absolutely poor households;
d. fees set by and largely remitted to the centre do not, in practice, 
have any very visible link to quality or quantity of services provided;
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e. nor do they, in practice, result either in greater user participation 
or provider accountability to users;
f. fees are usually set separately for different services with no attempt 
to see what the total burden of all fees on a household is likely to 
be, whereas household income is finite and all fees have to come out of 
it, if access to services is to be maintained;
g. potential revenue from basic service fees probably does not exceed 10% 
to 15% of overall health-education-water spending or rather under 2% of 
total government revenue requirements.
In the case of Health, two further problems arise. The most cost efficient 
means of improving health/reducing morbidity and mortality are preventative 
(e.g. MCH clinics, vaccination) and educational (e.g. APE). Yet because 
these are services used largely by well people they are the ones whose use 
would be most deterred by fees. Further, it is a sound economic principle 
to collect when income is highest and extraordinary expenses lowest. User 
fees for health services breach that principle: illness reduces income and 
imposes time (home care, assisting to medical facility) and cash (e.g. 
transport) costs. In other words point of use health fees fall at times 
when income is lowest and other extraordinary costs highest.
This set of criticisms does not mean all fees are unsound. To the extent
the services are used primarily by not so poor, or not poor persons, the 
individual bills are large enough to allow low ratios of
collection/accounting costs to collections and/or the households paying the 
fees would otherwise pay more to get the service from another source, fees 
are appropriate. It is their generalised use which is open to doubt. In 
theory, exemption systems could reduce the access problems for low income 
households. In practice, the administrative problems in a country with as 
many poor households as Mozambique either make such an approach non- 
workable or nearly totally wipe out anticipated collections - or both.
Is there an alternative approach to the resource mobilisation -
participation - accountability goals? If so, what are its constituent 
elements? And is it practicable in Mozambique?
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Six constituent elements can be set out:
1 . the contribution to cost should be set (negotiated) between a community 
and the actual service providing unit it uses;
2 . the community should be responsible for collection (and for using 
annual household charges or user fees or both, deciding on whether not 
poor households should pay more, determining who should be exempt, 
etc.);
3 . the entire contribution should be used at the level of the unit which 
the community uses (including payments for higher level services it 
actually receives, e.g. spares and technical personnel to repair a 
borehole or fontenario);
4 . the contribution should be in the form of resources which the community 
finds it least difficult to mobilise and which the unit can use (e.g. 
labour for maintenance and construction), certain equipment (e.g. 
chairs, desks, book cupboards for schools), food (for unit use in 
school or patient meals or to supplement staff's cash incomes) as well 
as cash.
5. the negotiated setting of the contribution should include discussion of 
community priorities for the service and criticisms of its existing 
availability and/or quality;
6 . The Ministry of Finance should conduct a rough check annually of total 
community support (especially in cash) being sought to ensure that 
individually reasonable targets do not add up to a disproportionate 
burden on household budgets.
This approach is not particularly complicated in principle. There are a
number of specific cases in which it has worked in Africa - including APE's
in Mozambique until war devastated village household incomes. But it does
pose several problems:
1- massive decentralisation is needed because neither at National nor
Provincial level is it possible to negotiate nor to aggregate non-cash 
contributions;
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2 . the resource contribution potential of communities varies widely among
and probably even within districts;
3. the system is very vulnerable to failure of communities to collect and
'pay over' agreed contributions, to failure of the Ministry or
Directorate to provide agreed levels of complementary inputs and to 
calamities (e.g. drought, bandidos attacks) which make meeting the 
budgeted contribution impossible for certain communities.
Nevertheless, this approach appears more promising than the centrally 
prescribed fixed user fee one. Experiments along these lines are envisaged 
in both the APE rebuilding and the canisa fontenario water extension 
projects partially funded by the SDA Project.
Somewhat different considerations apply when even the basic levels of a 
service are beyond government capacity to supply over a 5 to 10 year time 
perspective. For example, the maximum 1995 primary school enrollment ratio 
- both in budgetary and on qualified teacher availability grounds - would 
appear to be 60%. If by that date rural enrollments are to regain 1980 
levels a freeze on urban enrollments would be required. That would imply 
rapidly growing numbers of urban primary school candidates unable to secure 
a place.
In principle these could attend "informal" or community primary schools. 
These do exist and achieve useful results in some African countries. 
However, again certain obstacles exist:
1 . where would such schools locate competent teachers?
2 . could poor households bear the costs of even minimally adequate school 
funding?
3. would, in fact, nearly all children from absolutely poor households be 
excluded (ability tests at primary school entry age are not 
practicable; tests in ability to speak Portuguese, are but would 
discriminate against children from poor households)?
4. if increased dropping for poor performance is instituted before the 
first year is made more effective in teaching the language of 
instruction, would this add a further bias against children from 
absolutely poor households?
68
If the answers to these questions are unsatisfactory what actual options
exist?
CHAPTER VII.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS SECTORAL
A.
Health
1. Maintenance of urban coverage in Maputo and increasing coverage in 
other cities and towns to the same level;
2 . restoration of rural coverage as security permits - possibly using 
mobile or temporary units rather than immediately rebuilding still at 
risk postos, clinics and rural hospitals;
3. rehabilitation of building, vehicles and equipment and strengthening of 
maintenance and stock control (partly covered in World Bank Sectoral 
projects and discussions);
4. Organisation of effective estimation and active mobilisation to finance 
medical stores - including but not limited to drugs equipment, 
spares, vehicles and fuel;
5. re-estimation of personnel requirements for the above programme and re­
organisation of training facility throughput to match, with special 
attention to restoring the preventative health cadre (APE) which has 
declined since 1980, and developing an urban quarter parallel to the 
rural village health worker cadre (related World Bank sectoral projects 
and discussions plus SAD-APE project);
6 . costing of above programme followed by systematic resource mobilisation 
(Government budget, external support, community support, user charges) 
to meet the cost;
7. study of present fee and user charge systems (including their effect in 
limiting access by poor households) with a view to simplifying, 
consolidating, establishing clear exemption criteria and workable cost
69
offset provisions, better administration and collection (on a cost- 
efficient basis, i.e. 10% or less of collections) by 1992/3 (World Bank 
supported study in process);
8 . not raising charges or fees substantially until the study is concluded 
and, if new or increased charges are seen as appropriate, identifying 
and taking measures to offset probable denial of access effects as well 
as pre-introduction production of guidance manuals and forms and 
education of relevant personnel. In this context setting drug prices 
at 50% of cost (CIF plus mark-up) on the current exchange rate would 
avert a 140% price increase to users (making it about 20%) but might 
facilitate increased actual collection by allowing a less open-ended 
inability to pay exemption;
9. determining donor coordination, improved purchasing patterns, 
improvements in storage and stock control and reduction of wastes in 
use of drugs which could probably reduce costs by 30 to 40% (a multiple 
of any plausible estimate of drug charge collections). A key element 
is determining actual drug use patterns and the appropriateness of 
present mix of pharmaceutical supplies (should be related to World Bank 
Sectoral Programme);
1 0 . identifying operationally accessible individuals, households and or 
groups who are priorities for nutritional support with the 
identification process via normal health service operations (especially 
MCH) and with food security subsidy paid via a finance managed food 
subsidy. Coordination needed with commerce food security Unit; with 
Education (primary school feeding programmes for bread plus energy 
foods) and with the unit responsible for support to improved work-place 
canteen meals (albeit this is more an incentive and morale programme to 
raise key enterprise productivity than a targeted nutritional security 
one);
1 1 . developing a data collection and analysis system allowing evaluation of 
all personnel, physical and financial resource sources and uses of the 
Mozambican public health system including but not limited to cost and 
resource balance calculations (in part included in World Bank Sectoral 
Programme and other funded projects);
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1 2 . if - as appears likely - the data analysis reveals an imbalance has 
emerged against maintenance, spare parts, operating supplies (including 
petroleum products for mobility) non-pharmaceutical medical supplies 
and food relative to personnel, pharmaceutical supplies and equipment, 
seek to establish and maintain reasonable balances including by re- 
prioritising types of requests to donors. In the specific context of 
food for patients in hospitals distant enough from household abode to 
prevent relatives providing food, seek project food (and logistics) aid 
as a step toward reducing imbalance in relative resource availability;
13. to develop a medium term strategy of prevention and care in respect to 
HIV/AIDS. This syndrome will sharply increase numbers of terminal 
patients and of non-war orphans over the 1990s even if the adult HIV 
infection rate can be held below 6%. It is crucial to educate and take 
related preventative measures to avert an explosion to the 17% to 22% 
adult HIV positive rates of Malawi and Zambia.
Water/Sanitation
1. Conduct studies on incidence of water pollution, water and sanitation 
inadequacy-related diseases and nutritional implications (in 
collaboration with Ministry of Health) initially with particular 
reference to canisa, suburban and peri-urban areas;
2 . reverse fall in safe water accessibility by increasing canisa - 
suburban - peri-urban stand-pipe system primarily by boreholes and 
(where population density and pollution levels require) extension of 
pipelines from urban systems (pilot project under SDA-Project);
3. continue and - to the extent practicable expand - the rural pure water 
provision programme based on the lowest cost techniques suitable to 
particular localities;
4. experiment with community-based maintenance and operating cost recovery 
systems for stand-pipes (and some rural supply systems) with a view to 
achieving significant cost recovery by flexible systems - or 
opportunity - collection time-costs). Back up this approach with 
providing training in maintenance and simple repair to user committees 
(probably predominantly made up of women who bear the primary 
responsibility for household watering);
5. participate with Health, Education, Housing Directorate, Agriculture 
and Transport in identifying means to extend canisa areas with 
additional plot and machamba allocation, provision of basic health- 
water-education services and extension of accessible cost transport (by 
bus or - in the cases of Maputo and Beira - perhaps by introduction of 
commuter rail services on existing lines);
6 . build on the experience with the re-launched Maputo refuse collection 
system to restore comparable services in other major cities and to 
extend their coverage to meet canisa requirements.
Education
1. Continue high level of primary education access in Maputo and develop 
comparable levels in other provincial capitals and towns but in an 
overall frame compatible with full restoration of past (usually 1980 to 
1982) peak rural enrollments;
2 . address the three key constraints on educational quality - initial lack 
of ability in language of instruction (especially for poor household 
children). Lack of textbooks (again especially severe for children of 
poor households) and too short a school day (in triple shift cases) - 
leading to high repetition and dropout;
3. address the facility, equipment, text, personnel and other requirements 
of the two previous policy implications and seek to augment Government 
funds with coordinated (by the Ministry) donor support to selected 
recurrent as well as to capital expenditure;
4. review present education charges and other costs with a recognition 
that for poor households their current levels virtually preclude 
attendance of more than one child beyond the fifth class and for rural 
an additional cost burden (compared to urban) is imposed by boarding 
charges since secondary schools are rarely within walking distance;
5. review the high cost, low volume, inefficiently privatised text book 
system with a view to utilising donor aid for materials and press 
rehabilitation to create a stock of texts which would be owned by the 
schools and "rented" to pupils for an annual charge (based on a life of 
- say - six years) with full cost charged only on lost or destroyed 
books;
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6 . restore levels of basic adult literacy and applied continuing education 
with special attention to skills and techniques of value to poor 
household heads (especially female ones) in augmenting earned income;
7 . develop a system for articulated analysis of resource levels, uses, 
trends and balances analogous to that to be developed by health. 
(Several, not all, of these policy implications relate to World Bank 
Sectoral Programme projects or discussions.);
8 . evaluate operation of school feeding programmes (in conjunction with 
MOH) to determine impact on attendance, academic performance and 
nutrition levels and to access cost efficiency relative to other 
nutrition support interventions.
Commerce
1. Improve the efficiency of operation of the Maputo and Beira 
abastecimento system operations and extend them to other provincial 
capitals and major towns (ongoing World Bank project relates in part);
2 . consider whether other low cost staple goods (e.g. bread, cassava) 
could be sold (on a full cost/fair price basis) via the abastecimento 
shops;
3. monitor abastecimento sales to test whether increased flexibility in 
purchasing and increased minimum wages have significantly improved poor 
household ration take-up since mid-1988;
4. in conjunction with DPCCN seek to agree a system of national swops of 
donor supplied food to avoid situations in which staples for free 
distribution are available but none for sale or vice versa;
5. improve donor education on actual food aid requirements (including 
commodities other than grain) and the need for orderly, predictable 
inflow patterns;
6 . cooperate with Industry, Agriculture, Transport in improving familial 
sector physical access to agricultural inputs and to basic consumer 
goods to make price incentives to produce for sale effective, in order 
to augment both domestic marketed food flows and familial sector real 
incomes (including self-provisioning food production);
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7. jointly with DPCCN coordinate with Transport in regard to logistics 
issues involving roads, bridges, secondary ports and coastal shipping 
directly relevant to domestic urban and rural marketing and also on 
transport pricing and increased use of private lorry hauliers;
8 . rerun the 1988 Maputo and Tete Urban Household studies regularly until 
Statistics is able to launch its broader study and seek to add at least 
one more provincial capital and a peri-urban rural area;
9. coordinate with MOH (nutrition) on nutritional studies to identify 
nutritional deficiency, vulnerability and priority for support groups 
especially initially in urban, suburban and peri-urban areas.
Housing
1. Identify and implement a sustainable cost recovery system for 
maintenance and rehabilitation of concrete cities without excluding 
low-income households now resident in them unless and until alternative 
adequate, cost accessible housing is made available to them (World Bank 
ongoing project relates);
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2 . complete study of actual range and distribution of present rents and 
their impact on low-income tenant households (taking into account the 
fact of re-letting which is inevitable even at present - and more so at 
increased - rent levels;
3. develop a flexible multiple choice approach to canisa and adjacent 
peri-urban areas housing (including upgrading of present houses and 
coordination with Health, Education, Water, Agriculture - in respect to 
machamba allocation - and Transport as well as additions to the 
housing stock):
i. site and service schemes (World Bank project relates but previous 
African experience suggests it will be accessible only to middle 
and lower middle income groups;
ii. rehabilitation and upgrading of existing housing in collaboration 
with community groups (as successfully supported by the World 
Bank in Lusaka "compound" peri-urban areas);
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iii. development of improved traditional or "new" low cost building 
materials and techniques to reduce present canisa costs for 
constructing either a traditional or a "modern" house (UNDP 
project relates);
iv. allocation of delineated plots for informal sector construction 
with parallel provision of stand-pipes, primary schools and 
health posts, machambas and commuter transport. (On present 
Maputo/Provincial Capital experience, and that elsewhere in Sub- 
Saharan Africa the dominant way poor households can acquire 
access to any housing is by such informal construction or by 
renting rooms in such construction.) Possibly technical 
assistance and fair price supply of building materials (on full 
cost recovery basis) to informal building sector and (if 
financially viable and administratively recoverable) materials 
loans at subsidised interest rates to would-be home owners.
Energy
1. Facilitate effective access to lower cost (coal, kerosene) fuel sources 
for urban low-income households with introduction (to economic 
enterprise production preferably by labour intensive methods) of 
appropriate, user acceptable, low-cost stoves (World Bank project 
relates);
2. initial priority to Maputo (kerosene), Nampula (kerosene), Beira 
(kerosene) and Vila de Tete (coal) with subsequent extension to other 
towns where inadequate access to nearby wood-fuel sources is leading to 
prices beyond low-income household purchasing power and to 
environmental degradation (World Bank project relates in part);
3. continued study of potential (probably varying by locality and lowest 
for Maputo) for enhanced, sustainable production (agro-forestry) from 
plantations, small wood-lots and/or the familial sector as well as for 
increased efficiency in wood to charcoal conversion (and where 
appropriate finance for improved kilns in secure rural or peri-urban 
areas). The agro-forestry implications include building pole supply 
which is relevant to canisa housing costs and in most cases food and 
fodder, as well as cash sales of - e.g. citrus, from a variegated tree 
plot.
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Industry
1. Sustain expansion of basic consumer goods and agricultural inputs to 
provide effective incentives for familial sector production (World Bank 
import support projects relate);
2. coordinate with Transport, Commerce and Agriculture to ensure that such 
goods are in fact transported to and commercialised in rural areas (EEC 
projects in respect to cashew and Mueda Plateau grain relate);
3. coordinate with Housing on enhanced production of low-cost construction 
materials;
4. seek to identify artisanal and informal sub-sectors which are labour 
intensive, sell to poor households and - if they can expand - would 
probably add to low-income group employment opportunities and to 
channel import supported financed raw materials and tools to them (on 
fully commercial basis);
5. provide extension service to these (and to "modern sector" small and 
medium scale enterprises) to enhance their technical, managerial, 
marketing and accounting capabilities;
6 . coordinate with Agriculture on possibilities for artisanal and small 
scale industrial development (especially but not only in food 
processing) in the Zonas Verdes (initially those of Maputo, Beira and 
Nampula) and adjacent peri-urban rural areas (initially those of Maputo 
and Tete Provinces and those adjacent to Xai Xai and Inhambane when 
security permits);
7. continue encouragement (via inter alia price and market liberalisation 
and selective privatisation) of small scale entrepreneurial expansion 
of output and employment and consider parallel efforts in respect to 
medium and large scale mixed enterprise development in respect to 
moribund state enterprises nominally capable of producing basic 
consumer, agricultural input or simple construction materials which are 
in scarce supply (and therefore often unavailable to the familial 
sector or in secondary towns and only at candonga prices in main 
cities);
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8 . coordinate with Labour in identifying returning or returned miners with 
skills needed in the industrial and service sector with a view to job 
placement (to increase efficiency and output as well as to reduce 
unemployment) with or without short retraining courses.
Labour
1. Improve labour (wage employment in formal sector) statistics as to 
coverage, articulation by type of employment and employer, and income 
distribution;
2 . initiate studies toward developing systematic estimates of economically 
active population including familial sector, urban- peri-urban 
"informal" sector, casual employment with articulation by type of 
activity and income distribution (cash and total including self- 
provisioning);
3. conduct a sample personpower (manpower) survey to identify major 
skills, gaps and future requirements in coordination with Education's 
review of technical institution sectoral capacity by category (World 
Bank project relates);
4. seek to facilitate these data developments by liaison with Statistics 
on possible inclusion of relevant questions in the forthcoming National 
Census and its processing and analysis programmes.
Agriculture
1. In respect to Zonas Verdes:
i. build on existing surveys to identify research and extension 
priorities;
ii. seek to increase the present 33 to 50% of total machambas which 
are productive by means including, but not limited to, small-scale 
irrigation;
iii. identify areas in which machamba areas could be extended with a 
preference in allocation to absolutely poor, female headed, no 
salario income households;
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iv. implement a preferential policy for machambas, to poor households
including self-organised co-ops of machamba holders and largely 
excluding allocations or re-allocations to medium to large 
commercial farms, in respect to existing Zonas Verdes machambas 
and any extensions to the Zones.
2. In respect to peri-urban rural areas (those at least nominally 
purchasing an estimated 40% of food from commerce network):
i. conduct studies similar to Zonas Verdes ones including question 
such as soil exhaustion in the areas and farming (by day walks to 
insecure farms) outside them;
ii. seek to establish extension and input supply programmes to augment 
production (primarily for household self-provisioning).
3. In rural areas proper (initially primarily in relatively secure ones
such as Cabo Delgado Plateau, Beira Corridor, selected districts in
Niassa, Tete and Manica):
i. conduct a familial sector sample survey (or surveys) to identify 
farm/cultivated areas sizes, uses, crops, livestock, techniques 
(including rotation system, tools and inputs), housing/household 
equipment conditions, family income (including self-provisioning, 
produce sales, other income), in coordination with Commerce 
nutrition levels;
ii. on the basis of this study identify research, extension and input 
supply priorities;
iii. in parallel review research and survey results in relatively 
similar familial agriculture in adjacent countries (e.g. making 
use of SACCAR in Gaborone) to provide another guide to likely 
problems and potentially promising approaches;
iv. coordinate with Statistics on possible questions in Census to 
facilitate subsequent agricultural sector baseline data analysis 
and subsequent updating.
4. Conduct sample surveys in densely populated (resettlement, peri-urban 
and limited secure zones) rural areas in which traditional familial
78
sector long rotation is not practicable to identify soil exhaustion and 
longer term ecological problems and possible new techniques, inputs or 
other measures to contain them;
5. coordinate with Commerce, Industry and Transport on issues relating to 
providing input, transport, market (to buy as well as to sell) access 
to increasing numbers of familial sector households to allow them to 
produce more for self-provisioning and sale and to incentivate them to 
produce more;
6 . coordinate rural rehabilitation of nominally stable familial sector 
households production either with the Emergencia rehabilitation aspects 
or with a strategic Rehabilitacao programme (resettlement areas/farms; 
seed-tool-basic household equipment supply, interim food supply until a 
crop is harvested) components and seek to mobilise external finance 
(whether through Emergencia, Rehabilitacao or otherwise) to extend 
these to all familial sector households with an initial emphasis on 
newly secure or semi-secure areas (e.g. Angonia);
7. monitor the adequacy and equity of producer prices for the familial and 
small commercial farm sectors on an ongoing basis and seek improvements 
in Agricom and other marketing and transport sector enterprises' cost 
efficency (private or public) to reduce the farm to market (domestic or 
export) cost share in the final price;
8 . complete articulation and preparation for implementation of the 
agricultural aspects of the PDP (Priority District Programme).
Transport
1. Take rural income restoration and food security consideration into 
account in strategic project (Beira, Limpopo, Nacala Corridors and Sena 
Line) design and prioritisation while recognising that these will not 
normally be the dominant consideration in regional interstate route 
rehabilitation and development;
2. develop a phased rural transport infrastructure rehabilitation 
programme with rural production and food security aspects specifically 
addressed and encompassing Emergencia food distribution related 
infrastructural projects and - more particularly - with PDP and
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Rehabilitacao (which potentially will, over 8 to 10 years, cover 
virtually all major rural areas);
3. pay specific attention to small and medium ports which provide the key 
to access for a significant proportion of the rural population with 
special attention to badly run down ones such as Mocimboa da Praia and 
Inhaca - a goal likely to be facilitated by separation of secondary and 
tertiary ports from Railways and Main Ports under a Domestic Ports 
Authority and attention to their needs within the structures of the 
relevant overall Provincial rehabilitation and development strategies;
4 . facilitate build up of both public and private enterprise vehicle 
fleets and supporting access to spares and maintenance workshops 
including extension of existing programmes to secure externally soft- 
financed lorries to sell for MT on credit terms to private hauliers;
5. continue development of cabotage fleet and explore ways of assisting 
private informal sectors to re-establish small sailing and rowing 
vessel fleet which used to provide direct access for village and rural 
households near the coast or estuaries. This may require providing
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wood (e.g. from Cabo Delgado or abroad), other construction inputs and 
tools to reactivate artisanal shipyards;
6 . encouragement to efficient use of public sector lorries by avoiding 
empty back-hauls (as grain supply lorries to Tete and Niassa do by 
securing Malawian export return cargoes and Charbomac coal export fleet 
by hauling grain from Zimbabwe to Tete) and by identifying ways to 
reduce waiting time between trips;
7. review of present regulated transport rates which appear uncoordinated 
with a range from impossibly low (some road traffic) to surprisingly 
high (coastal passenger traffic). Total deregulation may not be
prudent given extreme scarcity of transport equipment and limited
number of operators but if regulation is kept regular six monthly
revisions are needed to cope with inflation and emergency ones to
handle sudden, large (say over 20%) fuel price boosts;
8 . subject to checking channel depth at the bar, re-instituting barge 
service on the Zambezi to Tete with 50 tonnes barges and pusher-tugs 
ferrying food up and coal (for domestic use), sugar or other products
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back thereby restoring access to a not insubstantial population along 
the river. The barge route could terminate with transhipment to 
cabotage vessels at Chinde or (with four barge lashes) continue to 
Beira subject to weather conditions. (When the Sena rail line is 
restored to Caia, consideration could be given to transhipment at that 
point);
9 . evaluate introduction of low-cost urban commuter transport (possibly 
using self-propelled cars) on the existing rail lines outside Maputo 
and Beira;
9 . evaluate introduction of low-cost urban commuter transport (possibly
using self-propelled cars) on the existing rail lines around Maputo and 
Beira to lower cost and facilitate ease of access to urban centres from 
canisa and peri-urban areas.
Planning/Statistics
1. Develop National Census question design and especially 1991/1992 
Household Survey (UNDP project relates) in coordination with other 
Ministries to draw on their experience (e.g. Commerce Household 
Surveys) and to include key questions and processing facilities for 
providing them with processed and/or analysed information;
2. coordinating with Agriculture on the possibility of an early baseline 
sample census for the Agricultural Sector perhaps initially for Zonas 
Verdes, peri-urban and selected secure districts;
3. explicitly introducing human condition and absolute poverty reduction 
considerations into general analytical and programmatic work of 
Planning Commission staff;
4. develop its policy capacity to evaluate and coordinate Ministerial 
recurrent policies and operations - including in relation to absolute 
poverty reduction;
5. undertake overall coordination of the PDP at National and Provincial 
levels;
6 . develop a capacity to evaluate total resource use in the Recurrent- 
Emergencia-Capital budgets in order to increase ability to analyse and
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alter allocations in respect to national strategic objectives including 
reduction of absolute poverty;
7. introduce a broader set of criteria - notably in respect to direct and 
indirect benefits to poor and absolutely poor Mozambicans - to be 
applied to including, rejecting or amending projects proposed for the 
Investment Plan and for modifying, rephasing or even dropping those now 
included where appropriate.
B.
Personnel: Numbers, Tasks, Retraining
Mozambique's public service is frequently characterised as too many, too 
little trained, too inefficiently allocated, too little paid, too expensive 
and too unproductive. Each criticism has a certain degree of truth but 
each is too simple.
The total non-uniformed government service is 100-110,000. That is not 
much over half the norm for a very poor country of 15,000,000. Further, 
outside health and education, the portion of norm is about one-third. 
Overall Mozambique needs at least as many civilian public servants as now - 
which is not to say in the same posts or all the same people.
Agriculture and Water need more at all levels and Works and Transport do at 
least at Provincial and District levels. Education may have enough 
teachers but not in rural areas. Districts may have wrong posts, but on 
the whole have so few staff - especially above very junior level - as to 
make decentralisation at design, technical and monitoring level to them a 
very long term process. Many Ministries may have too many posts loosely 
termed "administrators" but frequently operational administration (the 
getting system moving level between top level public service decision 
takers and action coordinators and lower level clerks/secretaries) is in 
fact absent.
Pay is too low. At the bottom it is a barely adequate foundation on which 
to erect a household income to stay out of absolute poverty. At the top it 
provides inadequate incentives for good public servants to stay in post 
rather than drive off to private sector and aid agencies or fly abroad.
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Even 16 years after independence many staff have not been retrained to 
upgrade their knowledge and skills for the posts they hold. To begin doing 
that systematically and rapidly would appear urgent if existing, let alone 
expanded or new, programmes are to be run well. Each Ministry-Province 
needs to identify persons needing more training to do present or proposed 
new tasks and how this could be provided in Mozambique and - preferably - 
part time or night near work place.
These problems are not unique to absolute poverty reduction work but 
because much of it is new or represents a return to the countryside after 
an extended absence the weaknesses of public service capacities are likely 
to be peculiarly acute. New programmes should identify specifically:
a. post required where, to do what, with what training and/or experience 
requirements;
b. number of posts existing and capability and training levels of holders;
c. what are minimum new post and training/retraining requirements looking 
five years ahead;
d. what this will cost.
Overall issues - e.g. pay and other terms and conditions, "peace dividend" 
reallocations from uniformed to civilian public service financing - are not 
within the scope of this paper. They relate to overall public service 
review now in progress but evidently will effect the numbers and morale of 
public servants struggling against absolute poverty.
C.
Institutions for Decentralisation and Coordination
The structure of coordination - to allow both national frameworks and 
meaningful decentralisation - has been discussed in the last chapter. 
Because they are coordinative not conglomerative or parallel institution 
building, they depend on decentralisation in articulation, operation and 
on-going monitoring.
The key units in this are logically Provincial Directorates of operating 
Ministries plus those of Planning and Finance. If articulation, resource 
(including personnel), specialised service provision and operating level
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coordination do not function at Provincial Level, then the struggle against 
poverty will remain a relatively empty slogan outside Maputo. There is no 
reason to assume each Provincial Directorate will need or want identical 
structure, but most will need more professionals and para-professionals and 
more training/retraining.
Decentralisation to Districts poses problems. With - usually - under 250 
staff and (excluding Health and Education) very few professionals.
Districts cannot be design-action-monitoring units with the same degree of 
decentralisation as Provinces. But they do need to be involved because 
direct user (including absolutely poor household) participation in design 
and monitoring - as well as implementation - can only operate in full at 
this level. How to structure it and to relate it both to public servants 
in district and to involved specialists from Provincial level requires 
painstaking attention and - once begun - an on-going review of 
effectiveness.
Building up District public service capacity is crucial to building up 
meaningful decentralisation to that level. While its general parameters 
fall outside the scope of this paper, some points can be made:
a. over the 1990s both financial and training constraints will place 
severe limits on District staff build-up since Provinces are not so 
fully or comfortably staffed as to allow for massive transfers;
b. Agriculture and Works are likely to need to enhance District capacity 
over the short run more than other sectors because cropping, grazing, 
agro-forestry, maintaining and constructing have more and 
geographically narrower contextual specificities than - say - Health, 
Education or even Water;
c. installing over 100 planning units is totally unfeasible on staffing 
grounds. However, while the District Administrator should remain the 
central official, his non-Rehabilitation and Development workload may 
mean a Deputy RA specifically designated (and trained) to coordinate 
and monitor, e.g. PDP, Rehabilitacao at District level will be needed.
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CHAPTER VIII.
AN EPILOGUE COMMENDING ACTION
The explicit and implicit requirements of the strategic and programmatic 
initiatives set out above are daunting. The tale of the swamp drainage 
worker beset by a flood applies: when you are on tip toe on not very firm 
ground with your nose barely above water and crocodiles are swimming toward 
you, it is difficult to remember you went in to drain the swamp. But - in 
respect to enabling poor people to produce more, to have access to 
infrastructure and to be provided with infrastructure to drain the swamp of 
poverty - that is what Mozambique and its public service set out to do.
Now, when the waters of economic disaster have begun to subside and the 
crocodiles of war are being beaten back, is the time for the goal to be 
recalled and reasserted in practice.
The dream of development remains alive. Whatever their weaknesses, the 
amount of civil governance and the delivery of services that has survived 
protracted war and fiscal stringency are surprisingly high. The form a 
base for trying again (as the rabbit said when he set out to slay the 
elephant trampling on his family's homes - and, in the waSukuma folk tale, 
he achieved his goal).
But will alone is not enough. Knowledge, competence (including 
retraining), identifying priority programmes and sequences, mobilising and 
allocating resources matter. Each may be only one brick in the battlements 
of an overall strategy to overcome absolute poverty but without humble 
bricks no grand battlements can be raised and with half-baked ones they 
speedily collapse.
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TABLE I.
P O P U L A T I O N  A R T I C U L A T I O N :  1 9 8 9
P R O V I N C E
URBAN
(a)
U R B A N
SUB-URBAN TOTAL
DISLOCATED
(b)
AFFECTED
(c)
R U R A L
COMMERCE
CUSTOMERS
(d)
OTHER
(e) TOTAL
TOTAL
POPULATION
MAPUTO URBAN 1,050,000 _ 1,050,000 _ _ _ _ 1,050,000
MAPUTO PROVINCE 150,000 46,000 196,000 173,300 224,900 198,000 7,800 604,000 800,000
GAZA 50,000 41,500 91,500 38,500 657,800 87,500 324,700 1,108,500 1,200,000
INHAMBANE 120,000 77,500 197,500 187,900 425,000 152,000 347,600 1,112,500 1,310,000
SOFALA 212,000 43,300 255,300 125,000 195,000 142,538 524,162 986,700 1,242,000
MANICA 37,000 16,000 53,000 93,100 147,500 38,000 432,400 711,000 764,000
TETE 25,000 24,325 49,325f 97,000 125,000 138,234 600,441 960,675 1,010,000
ZAMBEZIA 125,000 102,835 227,835 538,500 364,900 191,227 1,755,538 2,850,165 3,076,000
NAMPULA 287,515 42,500 330,015 200,500 535,900 209,185 1,667,400 2,612,985 2,943,000
CABO DELGADO 40,000 40,000 80,000 36,400 79,400 30,000 908,200 1,054,000 1,134,000
NIASSA 45,000 24,000 69,000 199,300 119,300 6,000 241,4Q0 566,000 635,000
TOTAL 2,141,515 457,960 2,599,475 
(3,597,159)g
1,689,500 2,874,700 1,192,684 6,809,641 12,566,525
(l,373,841)h
15,166,000
f
REFUGEES FROM MOZAMBIQUE - 1,200,000
a. INCLUDES CONCRETE AND CANICO AREAS BUT NOT NECESSARILY PERI-URBAN
b. ASSUMED TO BE 30% SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD PRODUCTION
c. ASSUMED TO BE 40% SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD PRODUCTION
d. ASSUMED TO BE 60% SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD. LARGELY PERI-URBAN AREAS
e. RESIDUAL. INCLUDES STABLE RURAL HOUSEHOLDS BUT ALSO 
THOSE WHOSE STATUS IS UNKNOWN
SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM TABLE OF 30.1.89 PREPARED
BY FOOD SECURITY DEPARTMENT MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE
f. TETE URBAN AREA SURVEY INCLUDES PERI-URBAN 
AS WELL AS URBAN AND SUB URBAN SO COVERS ON 
THE ORDER OF 100,000
g. 3,597,159 INCLUDES LARGELY PERI-URBAN RURAL 
FOOD CUSTOMERS OF MINISTRY OF COMMERCE 
COMMERCIAL NETWORK
h. 11,373,841 EXCLUDES LARGELY PERI-URBAN 
CATEGORY
TABLE II.
A B S O L U T E  P O V E R T Y  I B  M O Z A M B I Q U E
CATEGORY
URBAN
SUB-URBAN
% ABSOLUTE 
POVERTY
25-45%'
40-60%'
NUMBER 
ABSOLUTELY POOR
(535,000
(964,000
(183,000
(275,000
POPULATION
2,141,575
457,960
URBAN SUB-TOTAL 30-50%’ (720,000
(1,339,000
2,599,000
PERI-URBAN 40-60%* (477,000
(715,000
1,191,684
URBAN/PERI-URBAN 33-57% (1,298,000
(2,051,000
3,597,000
DISPLACED 
SEVERELY AFFECTED 
OTHER RURAL
100%3
90%4
59%5
1.690.000
2.587.000
3.405.000
1,690,000
2,874,700
6,809,239
RURAL EXCL. PERI-URBAN 68% 7,682,000 11,374,000
RURAL TOTAL 65-67% (8,159,000
(8,397,000
12,567,000
MOZAMBIQUE TOTAL 59-64% (8,879,000 15,166,000
REFUGEES 100%3 1,200,000 1,200,000
MOZAMBICANS TOTAL 62-67% (10,089,000
(10,936,000
16,366,000
NOTES:
30 to 50% range estimated from Maputo and Tete Household surveys. 30% is possible early 1989improvement 
following increase in minimum wage of about one-third promulgated as of November 1988. 50% is mid-1988
position as surveyed. Sub-urban areas treated as somewhat poorer than urban proper.
Rural residents purchasing food from Ministry of Commerce system. Partly standard peri-urban and partly 
ex-full scale farmers huddled in security zones. Low hectarage for cultivation and limited other 
sources of income.
Not all displaced persons and refugees have high rates of malnutrition or lack of access to health and 
education. But many do and in terms of other consumption and of income or the possibility of earning it 
virtually all are absolutely poor.
These are households which in general have lost almost all assets and have low levels of or opportunity 
for earned income like displaced persons some have fairly good nutrition levels from food aid and access 
to basic health and education.
Conservative estimate based on other low income African countries. Probably higher as in fact includes 
isolated and bandit enslaved households who are virtually all absolutely poor.
' ,i!* A POBREZA EM MOCAMBIOUE. Republica Popular de Mozambique, Consultancy Report, February 1989
TABLE m.
RESIDENT POPDLATIOH (’OOP)
Province 1980 1988 
N E
1990
N E
1995
N E
Area
(km")
MAPUTO - CITY 755.3 929.8 1,047.4 979.4 1,143.8 1,425.4 1,425.4 602
MAPUTO - PROV. 491.8 605.4 420.7 637.9 441.6 873.7 498.4 25,757
GAZA 990.9 1,219.8 1,043.0 1,284.6 1,094.8 1,409.7 1,235.6 75,709
INHAMBANE 997.6 1,228.1 1.095.7 1,293.7 1,150.1 1,447.1 1,298.1 68,615
SOFALA 1,065.2 1,311.3 1,259.1 1,381,6 1,321.6 1.543.3 1,491.6 68,018
MANTCA 641.2 789.3 723.6 831.2 759.5 923.7 857.3 61,661
TETE 831.0 1,023.0 867.1 1,076.9 910.1 1,213.9 1,027.2 100,724
ZAMBEZIA 2,500.2 3,077.8 2,594.6 3,241.8 2,723.3 3,619.5 3,073.7 105,008
NAMPULA 2,402.7 2,957.8 2,869.1 3,117.4 3,011.4 3,493.4 3,398.8 81.606
CABO DELGADO 940.0 1,157.2 1,122.8 1,219.8 1,178.5 1,372.9 1,330.1 82,625
NIASSA 514.1 632.9 479.3 666.6 503.1 751.4 567.8 129,056
COUNTRY TOTAL 12,130.0 14,932.4 13,522.4 15,730.0 14,237.8 18,074.0 16,204.0 799,380
URBAN AREAS 
RURAL AREAS
1,600.0
10,530.0
2,009.0
12,923.4
2,981.2
10,541.2
2,126.8
13,604.1
3,255.5
10,982.3
4,057.0
13,817.0
4,057.0
12,147.0
r
Note: N - Normal
E - Estimates discounting refugee and displace movements 
and estimated war-related deaths (Gersony Report)
SOURCE: Rodriguez, L.H./UNICEF 1989 - cited in The Situation of Children
and Women in Mozambique, Maputo, 1990
TABI.K IV.
NOTES:
P O P U L A T I O N  A N D  A B S O L U T E  P O V E R T Y  E S T I M A T E S :  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
Population (000) 1990'' 19951
Urban/Sub Urban 3,250 - 3,350 4,100
Peri Urban 1,150 - 1,250 1,300
Rural 10.000 - 10,500 12,200 - 12,400
Refugees 1,300 - 1,600 200 - 400
Total Population3 15,700 - 16.700 18.000 - 18.000
Absolute Poverty (000, %) 1990 2000
Refugees5 1,500 100% 300 100%
Dislocated Persons5 1,850 100% 350 100%
Affected Persons5 2,850 90% 225 75%
Pauperised in Home District 1,000 100% 200 100%
Peri Urban 625 50% 390 30%
Other Rural'1 2,200 50% 3,450 30%
Urban 1,000 30% 615 15%
Total (of 16,500) 11,025 67% 5.530 31%
(of 16,500) (of 18,000)
1 Revised and adapted from Tables I, II, III for 1990. 1995 ’Target’ Assuming Peace and
Absolute Poverty Reduction Strategic Priority.
2 End of year.
3 Probable overestimate. Indirect loss of life - especially Under 5s - not adequately 
adjusted for unless an off-setting rise in fertility is assumed.
"* Includes sector familial households operating normally but also isolated/whereabouts 
unknown households and those under bandit coercion.
For 1995 those who have not yet returned home, resettled, restored output.
s
TABLE V.
B R O A D  G O V E R N M E J T T / P U B L I C  U T I L I T Y  S P E N D I N G :
M O Z A M B I Q U E  1 9 9 0  V S  W O R L D  B A N K  L T P S  ' N O R M S ’
A. B. C.
Mozambique LTPS m
($ 000,000)
Emergency 350 iiooi2 350%
Defence 225 (50) 450%
Other Recurrent 325 900 36%
Total Recurrent 550 950 61%
Capital 375 1050 36%
Total 12753 2100 61%
Per Capita1 $ 85 $ 140 61%
1 For 15,000,000 Population
2 ( ) are interpolated estimates for sectors for which LTPS does not provide specific targets but
- implicitly - assumes will exist at some level.
3 Not comparable to formal budgets because of incomplete bringing to budget of external finance. 
Also not comparable to Total Domestic Resources plus Total Aid because of approximate exclusion 
of Technical Assistance paid to donor's nationals not entering Mozambique national/external 
accounts ($ 200-3000 million).
T A B L E  V I .
R E S T R U C T U R E D  P U B L I C  S P E N D I N G  
P O S S I B L E  T O  1 9 9 5 **
( $  0 0 0 , 0 0 0  -  1 9 9 0  P R I C E S )
Mozambique LTPS %
1995 Norm M/LTPS
Emergency 100 (117) 86%
Rehabilitation 250 -
Other Capital 500 - -
Total Capital 750 1225 61%
Defence 120 (60) 200%
Other Recurrent 560 1050 53%
Total Recurrent 680 1110 61%
Total 1530 2450 62%
Alt. Capital’"' 500 1225 41%
Alt. Other Recurrent** 830 1050 79%
Per Canita*** CO -J $140 62%
Assumes 5% annual growth domestic and external revenue and 4.5% resident population 
growth (including refugee return).
Transfers Rehabilitation to Recurrent Totals.
*"* 17,700,000
